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The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox: 
The Common Link Between Blackmail 
and Other Criminal Threats 
KEN LEVY 
Disclosure of true but reputation-damaging information is generally legal. 
But threats to disclose true but reputation-damaging information unless payment 
is made are generally criminal. Most scholars think that this situation is 
paradoxical because it seems to involve illegality mysteriously arising out of 
legality, a criminal act mysteriously arising out of an independently legal threat to 
disclose conjoined with an independently legal demand for money. But this is not 
quite right. The real paradox raised by the different legal statuses of blackmail 
threats to disclose and disclosure itself involves a contradiction between our 
strong intuition that blackmail threats should be criminal and some equally strong 
arguments, all of which depend on the fact that disclosure is legal, that blackmail 
threats should be legal. So an adequate solution to the real Blackmail Paradox 
requires us either to drop the intuition or to refute the pro-legalization arguments. 
This Article will adopt the latter approach. It will explain why the six main 
arguments for legalizing blackmail threats all fail. In the course of refuting one of 
these arguments, it will also offer a novel positive justification for criminalizing 
blackmail threats. It will argue that they should be criminal for the same reason 
that menacing, harassment, and stalking are criminal-namely, because they 
involve the reasonable likelihood, and usually the intent, of putting the victim into 
a state of especially great fear and anxiety. Of course, one might object that 
disclosure itself is likely to have the same effect, if not malicious purpose. Yet, 
again, it is still /ega/. But this point shows only that we as a society value freedom 
of speech more than we value freedom from infliction of emotional injury. It does 
not show that we do not value freedom from infliction of emotional injury 
sufficiently to protect it when competing moral or institutional interests such as 
freedom of speech are not at stake. 
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The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox: 
The Common Link Between Blackmail 
and Other Criminal Threats 
KEN LEVY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The so-called "Blackmail Paradox" starts with a simple legal fact: it is 
criminally punishable to make certain threats even though the threatened 
actions are by themselves perfectly legal. Consider the paradigmatic 
blackmail threat by "Blackmailer" against "Target": "If you don't give me 
$1000, I will send these pictures, which prove that you are having an affair, 
to your wife, friends, neighbors, and boss."1 Blackmailer's making this 
threat against Target constitutes a criminal act--even if Target did have an 
affair, Blackmailer does have the pictures, and Blackmailer obtained these 
pictures /egally.2 Yet if Blackmailer had not made the threat, it would have 
"' J.D., Columbia University Law School; Ph.D., Philosophy, Rutgers University; B.A., 
Philosophy, Williams College. Member, New York State Bar. Visiting Teaching Fellow, Columbia 
Law School. I would like to thank the following individuals for helpful discussions about blackmail 
and/or useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper: Jessica Attie, David Bender, Mitchell Berman, 
Walter Block, Kathryn H. Christopher, Russell Christopher, George Fletcher, Kent Greenawalt, Doug 
Husak, James Lindgren, The Honorable Richard Posner, The Honorable Jed Rakoff, David Reiss, Saul 
Smilansky, and George Vuoso. 
1 This Article will continue to use money as the object sought by the blackmailer. But other 
benefits would work just as well--e.g., sex, a job, a job recommendation, a promotion, a 
recommendation for promotion, property, political liberties, a larger divorce settlement, more kindness 
in a relationship, favorable testimony, a pardon, or legislation. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING 
LAW 550 (1995); Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 864 (1998) ("[T]he blackmailer need not demand money. Nor need he even 
seek private advantage (narrowly defined)."); Walter Block, The Crime of Blackmail: A Libertarian 
Critique, 1 8  CRJM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 3-4 (1999); George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic 
Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1617, 1621 (1993); Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmail from A to C, 141 U. PA. L. 
REv. 1905, 1910 ( 1993); Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1567, 1568 ( 1993); Kenneth Kipnis, Blackmail as a Career Choice: A Liberal Assessment, 1 8  CRIM. 
JUST. ETHICS 1 9, 20 (1999); Grant Lamond, Coercion, Threats and the Puzzle of Blackmail, in HARM 
AND CULPABILITY 2 1 5, 216 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996); James Lindgren, More 
Blackmail Ink: A Critique of Blackmail, Inc., Epstein's Theory of Blackmail, 16 CONN. L. REv. 909, 
917- 1 8  ( 1984). 
2 See, for example, the New York criminal code, which includes blackmail under both its criminal 
coercion and larceny by extortion statutes. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 135.60 (McKinney 2004) ("Coercion in 
the second degree") states in relevant part: 
A person is guilty of coercion in the second degree when he compels or induces a 
person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from 
engaging in, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which he has a legal right to 
engage, by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, 
the actor or another will: 
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been perfectly legal for Blackmailer to send the pictures to Target's wife, 
friends, neighbors, and boss. 
It is easy enough to explain why disclosure of Target' s  affair to third 
parties is legal. To be sure, it would very likely harm Target's reputation 
as a faithful, loving husband. 3 But, despite the damage that such a truthful 
disclosure will cause to Target's reputation (and other reputation-
4. Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be 
instituted against him; or 
5. Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, 
tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule ... . 
And N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 155.05 (McKinney 1999) ("Larceny'') states in relevant part: 
2. Larceny includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's 
property, with the intent prescribed in subdivision one of this section, 
committed in any of the following ways: 
(e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he 
compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or 
to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property 
is not so delivered, the actor or another will: 
(iv) Accuse some person of a crime or cause 
criminal charges to be instituted against him; or 
(v) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, 
whether true or false, tending to subject some person 
to hatred, contempt or ridicule ... . 
Like N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60, MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
("Criminal Coercion") states in relevant part: 
(I) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, 
with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to his 
detriment, he threatens to: 
(b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or 
(c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or 
ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute .. .. 
And like N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05, MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
("Theft by Extortion") states in relevant part: 
A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of 
another by threatening to: 
(2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or 
(3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or 
business repute . .. . .  
3 Lawrence M. Friedman offers a study of the way in which reputation and the laws protecting it 
have evolved since the 19th century. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, 
Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1093 (2002). Notably, 
Friedman suggests that blackmail laws historically "protected (or tried to protect) reputation," id. at 
1113, and that blackmail has a "more limited orbit," id. at 1126, than it did in the 19th and first half of 
the 20th century because what previously constituted a damaging secret is either (a) no longer (as) 
damaging due to ever-liberalizing norms of"respectability," id. at 1120, 1131, or (b) not a secret in the 
first place due to our ever-shrinking bubbles of privacy. See id. at 1119-32. Regarding (b), see also 
Michael Levin, Blockmai/, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS II, 13 (1999) ("It is a cliche that privacy is already 
tenuous in a world of electronic billing and ubiquitous camcorders."). 
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dependent interests),4 disclosure-whether in the form of gossip, tattling, 
or journalism-is justified by the institution of freedom of speech. 
Still, if disclosure is legal, then it would seem that the threat to disclose 
should also be legal. 5 For both the threat and the threatened action are 
4 While reputation may be the primary interest threatened by the blackmailer, secondary 
interests-interests that depend largely on reputation and therefore would likely also be injured if 
reputation were injured-include relationships and occupation or career. Scott Altman lists other 
interests that blackmailers may also threaten: "loss of dignity . . .  safety, freedom . . . and other 
similarly central aspects of the individual's life." Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail, 141 
U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1641 (1993). 
s Conversely, some might argue that if the blackmail threat to disclose is illegal, then disclosure 
itself should be illegal as well. For different views on this point, see Altman, supra note 4, at 1652-53 
(the wrongfulness of blackmail cannot be explained by the wrongfulness of disclosure); Berman, supra 
note 1, at 798, 843, 844-48, 849-51, 854 (only the blackmail threat, not disclosure, should be criminal 
because while both may lead to harm, (a) the blackmail threat is much more likely to arise from 
"morally culpable motives" and (b) enforcement of criminal law against disclosure with bad motives 
would involve a number of virtually insurmountable practical difficulties); Walter Block, The Case for 
De-Criminalizing Blackmail: A Reply to Lindgren and Campbell, 24 W. ST. U. L. REv. 225, 236 (1997) 
(the mere immorality of threatening to gossip is not sufficient for crirninalization); Richard A. Epstein, 
Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 553, 561 (1983) ("It is quite impossible to escape the problem of 
blackmail by redefining the property rights of [the victim] and/or [the third party] to make unlawful the 
disclosure of true information not itself acquired by wrongful actions."); Hugh Evans, Why Blackmail 
Should Be Banned, 65 PHIL. 89, 93 (1990) ("In most cases, the right to free speech prevails over the 
right not to be harmed."); Joel Feinberg, The Paradox of Blackmail, 1 RATIO JURIS 83, 89-94 (1988) 
(there is no paradox in crirninalizing blackmail because the disclosure of embarrassing information is 
or should be illegal); Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
43, 44, 47 n. l3, 52-53, 56 (1992) (public disclosure is legally permissible only because of "practical 
considerations"-namely, the costs and difficulties of enforcement; without these practical problems, 
"the malicious unilateral disclosure of the information" is just as wrong and therefore would be just 
prohibited as the threat of disclosure); Russell Hardin, Blackmailing for Mutual Good, 141 U. PA. L. 
REv. 17&7, 1793 (1993) ("Any claim to outlaw blackmail might seem weak if at the same time the sale 
of embarrassing information on another to the press remains legal."); Isenbergh, supra note I, at 1913 
("For some [who support the prohibition of blackmail], I think, the prohibition of bargaining between 
[the blackmailer] and [the target] serves as a proxy for a prohibition of [the blackmailer's] disclosure to 
[a third party]. That is, the premise that [the blackmailer] is free to disclose or keep secret private 
information about [the target] is not fully accepted."); Lamond, supra note 1, at 232 (disclosure is not 
punished because its consequences are not "sufficiently serious"); James Lindgren, Blackmail: On 
Waste, Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA L. REv. 597, 600 (1989) ("[I]f we changed the law so that 
it stopped the release of true information, then the [Blackmail Paradox] would disappear."); Richard H. 
McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2255-58, 2279-82 (1996) 
("[G]ossip serves as a way of adjudicating disputes over norm violations, and this process, in tum, 
refines the content of norms to resolve specific concerns."); Jeffrey Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156, 165 (1980) (even journalism does not morally justify deliberately 
embarrassing another, but ''we allow it reluctantly as the lesser of two evils (the greater evil would be 
to chill the press)."); David Owens, Should Blackmail Be Banned?, 63 PHIL. 501, 503 (1988) ("Do we 
really believe the threat of publication is so terrible? If so, why don't we ban publication? Why do we 
forbid him to make the threat but not forbid him to carry it out? Surely, it is the carrying out of the 
threat that does the harm."); Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1817, 1835 (1993) (gossip is an "informal and very cheap system of deterring . . .  lesser 
forms of wrongdoing"); Henry E. Smith, The Harm in Blackmail, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 861, 879-80 
(199&) (there is no law against disclosure itself in part because disclosure, unlike the blackmail threat, 
will not lead to victim self-help and therefore to the harms that typically result from victim self-help). 
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normally on the same legal footing. If the threatened action is legal (or 
illegal), then the threat is also legal (or illegal). Conversely, if the threat is 
legal (or illegal), then so is the threatened action. And there is a reason for 
this correlation. On the one hand, if a particular threat is sufficiently 
dangerous or wrong to be criminalized, then surely the threatened action­
which is arguably even more dangerous and therefore more wrong than the 
threat-should be criminalized as well. On the other hand, if a particular 
action is not sufficiently dangerous or wrong to be criminalized, then 
surely the threat of such an action-which is arguably even less dangerous 
and therefore less wrong than the threatened action itself-should not be 
criminalized either.6 So blackmail threats curiously depart from this 
normal state of affairs. Again, while disclosure is perfectly legal, 
blackmail threats to disclose are illegal (criminal!). 
Two arguments might be made here. First, one might argue that this 
departure from the norm is rather easy to explain. After all, the reason that 
disclosure is legal does not equally apply to the threat of disclosure. 
Again, disclosure is legal because it is supported by the institution of 
freedom of speech. And freedom of speech justifies only communication. 
It does not at all justify the opposite of communication-silence (including 
concealment). Nor, therefore, does it justify, or even relate to, a 
blackmailer's attempt to reap a profit from this silence.7 This argument 
may be true as far as it goes. But it does not go far enough. It fails to 
explain why blackmail threats should be criminalized in the first place. 
Yes, blackmail threats are not justified by the institution of freedom of 
speech. But many activities are not supported by free speech and yet are 
perfectly legal. So why doesn't the same hold true of blackmail threats? 
Why are they singled out from all of these other non-free-speech-supported 
activities for criminal punishment? 
Second, one might argue that there is nothing paradoxical about this 
departure from the norm. The fact that blackmail threats depart from the 
normal correlation between the legal statuses of threats and threatened 
actions hardly by itself constitutes a paradox. After all, there are 
6 For a characteristically astute and highly nuanced approach to threats, see KENT GREENAWALT, 
SPEECH, CRIMES, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 90--109 (1989). 
7 See Altman, supra note 4, at 1653; Evans, supra note 5, at 93 (''The right to free speech . . .  
justifies [a journalist's] harming [another] by publishing his secrets. It cannot permit harming him by 
extorting money for not publishing; the aims of free speech are not served thereby, and cannot give any 
justification for such an act. "); A. L. Goodhart, Blackmail and Consideration in Contracts, 44 LAw Q. 
REv. 436, 437 (1928) (quoting R v. Denyer, (1926) 2 K.B. 258, 268 ("There is not the remotest nexus 
or relationship between a right to (perform a harmful action A] and a right to demand [money] from 
[the target] as the price of abstaining from [performing A]. "); Wendy J. Gordon, Tntth and 
Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1770 (1993); James 
Lindgren, In Defense of Keeping Blackmail a Crime: Responding to Block and Gordon, 20 LoY. L.A. 
L. REv. 35, 41 (1986) (emphasizing the distinction between suppression and release of information). 
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exceptions to every rule. And most such exceptions are not considered 
paradoxical. So why blackmail? 
The most common answer to this question is that by criminalizing 
blackmail, we have mysteriously turned "two rights into a wrong." That is, 
we have combined two perfectly legal acts-a demand (request) for money 
and a threat (warning) to perform a legal action (e.g., disclosure)-into one 
illegal act. 8 But contrary to the common wisdom, this explication of the 
Blackmail Paradox is far too metaphorical to capture its essence.9 Yes, it 
might seem odd that an otherwise legal demand in conjunction with an 
otherwise legal threat to perform a legal action should be illegal. But odd 
is not paradoxical. Odd simply involves a deviation from the norm. 
Paradoxical involves a contradiction between intuition and argument. 10 So 
8 See LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF 
THE LAW 1 33 (1996); Berman, supra note 1, at 796; Block, supra note 1, at 3; Walter Block, Trading 
Money for Silence, 8 U. HAW. L. REV. 57, 63, 69 ( 1986); Walter Block& RobertW. McGee, Blackmail 
from A to Z: A Reply to Joseph Jsenbergh 's "Blackmail from A to C, " 50 MERCER L. REv. 569, 569-71 
( 1 999); Kathryn H. Christopher, Toward a Resolution of Blackmail's Second Paradox, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. 
J. 11 27, 1 130 (2005); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 84-85; Fletcher, supra note 1 ,  at 16 17; Hardin, supra 
note 5, at 1795; Katz, supra note 1, at 1567; Lindgren, supra note 5, at 598; Lindgren, supra note 1 ,  at 
909; James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670, 670-71,  680 
( 1984); Murphy, supra note 5, at 157; Ronald Joseph Scalise, Jr., Blackmail, Legality, and Liberalism, 
74 TuL. L. REv. 1 483, 1 484, 1502 (2000); Smith, supra note 5, at 862, 887; Glanville L. Williams, 
Blackmail, CRIM. L. REv. 79, 163 (1954) (''The two things that taken separately are moral and legal 
whites together make a moral and legal black."). 
9 For other critical views of this version, see Russell Christopher, Meta-Blackmail, 94 GEO. L.J. 
739, 743-45 (2006); Michael Clark, There is No Paradox of Blackmail, 54 ANALYSIS 54, 55-56 
( 1 994); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 85; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1 795-96; Lamond, supra note 1, at 216  
n.l ("(l]here is nothing strictly paradoxical in treating the combination of  two elements differently 
from the way each element is treated in isolation, nor in treating the threat of an action differently from 
the action itself."); Saul Smilansky, Blackmail, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 151 ,  1 5 1-52 (Lawrence 
C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 2001)  [hereinafter Smilansky, Blackmailj; Saul Smilansky, May 
We Stop Worrying About Blackmail?, 55 ANALYSIS 1 1 6, 1 1 6  (1995) [hereinafter Smilansky, May We 
Stop Worrying]. 
10 In personal correspondence, some have taken issue with my conception of a paradox. One 
objection is that I am being overly technical; a paradox is nothing more than a proposition that is true 
but bizarre or counterintuitive or apparently self-contradictory. Another objection is that a paradox is a 
conflict not between intuition and argument but rather between one intuition and another. I do not 
necessarily reject either of these possibilities. For the time being, however, I maintain my position, 
which derives from classic paradoxes in Philosophy-particularly, Zeno's Paradoxes and the Surprise 
Exam Paradox. Both kinds of paradox involve a contradiction between an intuition (e.g., there is 
motion) and an argument (e.g., because (a) every distance contains an infinity of sub-distances, (b) it is 
impossible to traverse an infinity of sub-distances, and (c) motion is just traversal of a distance, motion 
is impossible). (For helpful accounts of these paradoxes, see, for example, MICHAEL CLARK, 
PARADOXES FROM A TO Z 1-4, 7-8, 1 38-4 1, 159-{)0, 206-08 (2002)). My conception of paradox 
would explain why paradoxes may generally be resolved by maintaining the intuition and refuting the 
argument. As one author suggests, paradoxes "are resolved by pointing to the fallacy that generates 
them." George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1 263, 1263 ( 1985) 
(citation omitted). Fletcher, however, may diverge from me when he suggests in the preceding 
sentence: "[P]aradoxes are contradictions that result from overlooking an accepted canon of consistent 
thought." !d. at 1263. 
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it remains to be seen what is paradoxical about the criminalization of 
blackmail. 
The real paradox-the contradiction between intuition and argument­
is this. On the one hand, we tend to think that blackmail threats are rightly 
criminalized. That is our strong intuition. On the other hand, there are 
some very good arguments-six in fact-that lead to the very opposite 
conclusion, the conclusion that blackmail threats should be perfectly 
legal.1 1  
To solve this paradox-the real Blackmail Paradox-we have one of 
two choices. First, we may hold that our intuition is wrong, that the 
criminalization of blackmail is simply a giant legislative mistake, and 
therefore that blackmail threats should be just as legal as disclosure. A 
significant minority of scholars adopt this "pro-legalization" approach.12 
11 For various formulations of the Blackmail Paradox, see Altman, supra note 4, at 1639; Berman, 
supra note 1, at 800 ("[B]Iackmail is an exception to the general rule of law and morals that one may 
threaten to exercise one's rights."); Block, supra note 5, at 225; James Boyle, A Theory of Law and 
Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1479, 1486 
(1 992); R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 743-45; Ronald Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: 
Blac/cmail, 14 VA. L. REv. 655, 667--68 (1988); Epstein, supra note 5, at 561 (''The general proposition 
that a party may [not] threaten that which he may do makes blackmail an anomalous exception to the 
general pattern of both criminal and civil responsibility."); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, 
Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1 849-50 (1993); Gordon, 
supra note 7, at 1742; Gorr, supra note 5, at 43, 52 ("[1]he most important cases in which there is 
likely to be a serious question about the legal permissibility of blackmail are those in which the act that 
would motivate the blackmail (1) is morally wrong, (2) involves some significant harm to another 
person, and (3) is (justifiably) [neither required nor forbidden by the criminal law]."); Isenbergh, supra 
note 1 ,  at 1 932; Katz, supra note 1 ,  at 1 567, 1595, 1598; Kipnis, supra note 1 ,  at 19; Lamond, supra 
note 1 ,  at 215-16, 230-3 1 ,  23 7 (how does the threat to do ''what would otherwise be permissible" in 
conjunction with a demand for money constitute (a) a moral wrong, no Jess (b) a "serious criminal 
offence"?); James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 
141  U. PA. L. REV. 1 695, 1 695 (1993); Lindgren, supra note 7, at 35; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 677-
78; McAdams, supra note 5, at 2266--67; Murphy, supra note 5, at 1 60; Scalise, supra note 8, at 1502 
("[l]f blackmail simply presents one with two legal options (i.e., acquiesce to the demand or be 
subjected to the threatened action), how can increasing one's options turn a legal transaction into an 
illegal one?"); Smith, supra note 5, at 864. 
Different scholars have different opinions about the difficulty and legitimacy of the Blackmail 
Paradox. See, e.g., Block, supra note 5, at 228 (criticizing Lindgren for failing "to even consider that 
the legal proscription of blackmail could be mistaken and incomprehensible on rational grounds."); 
Clark, supra note 9, at 55-56 (adopting the deflationary position that the Blackmail Paradox is not 
paradoxical at all); Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox, 141 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1663, 1665 (1993) (the Blackmail Paradox "may not yield to rational analysis."); Gordon, 
supra note 7, at 1741 (the Blackmail Paradox is "neither puzzling nor paradoxical"; instead, it 
generates an "irony"); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: 
Blackmail, Extortion and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1 877, 1902 (1 993) (the Blackmail Paradox does 
not seem paradoxical ''when viewed through the lens of economics."). 
12 For articles advocating the view that blackmail should be either largely or entirely legalized, 
see MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 124-26 (1998); Walter Block, Blackmail is 
Private Justice: A Reply to Brown, 34 U. BRlT. COLUMBIA L. REV. 1 1 , 1 1-12 (2000) [hereinafter, 
Block, Private Justice]; Walter Block, Replies to Levin and Kipnis, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23, 23 
(1999) [hereinafter Block, Replies]; Block, supra note 5, at 225, 236; Block, supra note 1, at 3-4; 
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Second, we may hold that our intuition is correct. The vast majority of 
scholars who discuss the issue adopt this "pro-criminalization" approach.13 
Most pro-criminalizers believe that their primary, if not exclusive, task 
is to provide an adequate, positive justification for the criminalization of 
blackmail. And, indeed, they have been quite creative in this area. They 
have argued that the criminalization of blackmail is justified because: 
Walter Block, Toward a Libertarian Theory of Blackmail, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 55, 55-57 (2001) 
[hereinafter Block, Libertarian Theory]; Block, supra note 8, at 62-63; Walter Block & Gary M. 
Anderson, Blackmail, Extortion and Exchange, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 541, 560-61 (2001); Walter 
Block & David Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to Posner, Epstein, Nozick 
and Lindgren, 19 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 37, 38, 54 (1985); Block & McGee, supra note 8, at 569, 569-71; 
R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 782-84 ((a) "meta-blackmail"-i.e., a threat to make a blackmail 
threat-is either more "serious" a crime, equally serious, or less serious a crime than conventional 
blackmail; (b) none of these three logically exhaustive answers is adequate; and (c) the only way to 
resolve this trilemma is to de-criminalize conventional blackmail); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 88-89, 
94-95 ("on liberal grounds," blackmail threats to disclose information that the target has engaged in 
"devious trickery or underhanded dealing" should be legalized); Gorr, supra note 5, at 48-49 (some 
"high-minded" blackmail-i.e., blackmail in which the blackmailer truly deserves what the blackmail 
target acquired "by legally permissible trickery and underhanded dealing"-should be legally 
permitted); Isenbergh, supra note l ,  at 1908, 1926-32 (proposing a system that would prohibit only 
blackmail involving incriminating information, not blackmail involving merely embarrassing 
information); Eric Mack, In Defense of Blackmail, 41 PHIL. STUD. 273 (1982); Scalise, supra note 8, at 
1486 (agreeing largely with Feinberg that "blackmail is not a justifiable crime under a liberal system 
... blackmail cannot legitimately be criminalized because no one's rights are violated"). For various 
pictures of what society would look like if blackmail were legalized, see Block & Gordon, supra, at 45; 
Boyle, supra note 11, at 1478, 1487; Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1935, 1944-46 (1993); Epstein, supra note 5, at 562-64; Levin, supra note 3, at 13-14; 
Mc Adams, supra note 5, at 2245; Owens, supra note 5, at 503-04; Shaven, supra note II, at 1891; and 
Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 153. 
13 Another approach to blackmail that some scholars take is to propose not justifications but rather 
explanations of its criminalization. See Peter Alldridge, Attempted Murder of the Soul: Privacy and 
Secrets, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 368, 385-87 (1993) (blackmail is criminal because the kinds of 
threats it usually involves, threats to expose sexual secrets, are more frightening than any other kind of 
secret; they threaten to expose the "true" self behind the person's public persona); Block, supra note 5, 
at 246 ("One theory [of why so many believe that blackmail should be prohibited] is that the 
prohibition of blackmail is hoary with tradition. Blackmail has been against the law for so long that 
commentator's [sic] first instinct is to attempt to find explanations for this state of affairs, and by the 
very nature of all such efforts they soon enough come to resemble attempted justifications."); DeLong, 
supra note 11, at 1691 (we share a communitarian ethic according to which "the blackmail story elicits 
a strong identification with the victim's hopelessness and isolation" and "a blackmailer betrays ... the 
victim by demanding money for silence and betrays the public by accepting it"); Friedman, supra note 
3, at 1112, 1116 (blackmail was initially criminalized in part because a blackmailer's act of threatening 
to expose a target's secrets conflicted with the American value of "mobility"-i.e., ''the right to start 
over again, to begin a new life, unencumbered by the debris of the old one."); Murphy, supra note 5, at 
156 (our strong moral distaste for blackmail is only an explanation, not a justification, of its 
criminalization); Scalise, supra note 8, at 1501-02 ("The moral intuition that blackmail is wrong 
appears to be . . .  because the blackmailee's situation is one for which empathy often exists. Everyone 
can imagine oneself in the unenviable position of the blackmailee. In such a situation, a reputable 
citizen seems to have very little choice-either pay the demanded amount or risk social opprobrium 
and societal shame."); Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at 118-19 ("Part of the 
explanation for the perplexing attitude of common-sense morality on [blackmail] is probably cynical, 
e.g. that the thought of being blackmailed in the ordinary ways is frightening to the rich and powerful 
in society, who may be less concerned with e.g. the threats of employers or politicians."). 
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1 )  it helps to maximize disclosure of incriminating 
information and thereby deter criminal activity; 14 
2) it helps to minimize wasteful, inefficient, or private law 
enforcement;15 
14 For various positions on this issue, see GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 93-94 (there are three 
"instances of blackmail": those in which (a) disclosure would be "socially desirable"; (b) disclosure 
would be "socially undesirable but not illegal"; and (c) "the harm and benefit of disclosure are about 
evenly balanced"); POSNER, supra note 1, at 549, 549-50 (supporting proposition (1) but conceding 
that it is speculative); Berman, supra note 1, at 812-13 (prohibition of blackmail does not produce 
optimal deterrence and might even increase its incidence relative to legalization); Block, Private 
Justice, supra note 12, at 14 (Brown's assumption that "in the absence of legalization of blackmail the 
blackmailer would have spilled the beans to the police . .. appears unwarranted"); Block, supra note 8, 
at 72-73 ("[O]ne cannot overlook the indirect effect of the blackmailer in reducing crime. [T]he more 
[the blackmailer preys on the criminal], the less .. . crime there will be. The law of economic incentive 
applies to shoplifters as well as blackmailers."); Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 39-44 (legalization 
of blackmail would "retard" crime because "miscreants would now have to share their ill-gotten gains 
with the blackmailer."); Clark, supra note 9, at 58 ("It is a matter for empirical inquiry whether de­
criminalizing blackmail would mean that significantly more crime was concealed: and not only do we 
lack the evidence for this but it seems unlikely that we shall ever have it, considering the nature of the 
conduct involved."); DeLong, supra note 11, at 1670-72 (criticizing Posner); Friedman, supra note 3, 
at 1112 ("[M]aking blackmail a crime might deter possible blackmailers."); Ginsburg & Shechtman, 
supra note I I, at 1871-73 (blackmail is not always an efficient deterrent); Gordon, supra note 7, at 
1751-53 ((a) legalization might actually lead to more, not less, disclosure; (b) not all of this disclosure 
will be socially valuable; and (c) while legalization might help to promote deterrence and some socially 
valuable disclosure, the transaction costs involved in blackmail transactions might outweigh these 
benefits); Gorr, supra note 5, at 49 ("[B]Iackmail remains clearly paradoxical only in cases where the 
blackmailer (1) obtains her information innocently, (2) is under no special obligation to maintain 
confidentiality, (3) demands, in return for her silence, that the victim perform an act that is not itself 
either legally required or legally forbidden, and (4) threatens that, if her demands go unmet, she will 
perform an act that is not itself either legally required or legally forbidden."); James Lindgren, 
Blackmail: An Afterword, 141 U. PA . L. REv. 1975, 1984-85 (1993) (it is wrong to assume that without 
an incentive to blackmai� embarrassing or incriminating information would not otherwise be disclosed 
because the simple fact is that people like to gossip); Lindgren, supra note 5, at 602-03 (same); 
McAdams, supra note 5, at 2268--{)9 (criminalization of blackmail does not necessarily lead to less 
overall crime because while criminalization leads to relatively greater disclosure than would 
legalization, legalization would lead to greater detection of crime-specifically, a greater incentive 
among private citizens to detect criminal activity among their fellow citizens; and it is not clear which 
of these--greater disclosure or greater detection--,.would serve as a stronger deterrent); Posner, supra 
note 5, at 1839-41 (it is not clear that severe punishment for blackmail is warranted "from a deterrent 
standpoint''); Shaven, supra note 11, at 1891-92, 1899-1901 (it is not clear what effect the prohibition 
of blackmail has on deterrence because while it is less probable that crime will be discovered and 
therefore punished, the magnitude of the punishment for the crimes that are discovered will be greater 
than if blackmail were legal); Smith, supra note 5, at 897-906 (while criminalization can help to 
increase the costs of enforcement, it does help to minimize the costs of victim self-help); Jeremy 
Waldron, Blackmail as Complicity 16-17 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Connecticut 
Law Review) (rejecting proposition (1) above). 
15 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 2, 42 (I 975) (blackmail is a crime because society prefers ''to rely on a public monopoly of 
law enforcement in some areas of enforcement, notably criminal law"). For various positions on this 
issue, see POSNER, supra note I, at 548 ("There is no completely adequate economic explanation for 
why ["regulatory" (i.e., private-law-enforcing)] blackmail is illegal."); Block, Private Justice, supra 
note 12, at 17, 23-24, 30-37 (criticizing Landes and Posner and Brown); Boyle, supra note 11, at 1472 
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3) it helps to maximize disclosure of, and thereby deter, 
immoral activity;16 
4) it helps to prevent a market in embarrassing information 
from developing, which itself helps to discourage wasteful 
and invasive efforts to discover embarrassing information 
about others.l7 ' 
5) it helps to mtmmtze wasteful or inefficient economic 
activity; 18 
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(criticizing Landes and Posner); Brown, supra note 12, at 1936-37, 1940, 1943-49, 1952-58, 1967-73 
(criticizing Landes and Posner and taking a position similar to Epstein's); Epstein, supra note 5, at 
561-62, 564 (while the legalization of blackmail would have a deterrent effect by encouraging some 
would-be criminals to refrain from criminal activity for fear of being blackmailed with this information 
afterward, the problems with "private justice" outweigh its deterrent benefits); Ginsburg & Shechtman, 
supra note 11, at 1874 (even if the private enforcement of social norms would be inefficient, this point 
would not explain why blackmail that does not involve social norms-i.e., blackmail involving 
information that is embarrassing yet not morally repugnant-is prohibited); Gordon, supra note 7, at 
1753 (favorably mentioning Landes and Posner); Lindgren, supra note 1, at 911 (criticizing Landes and 
Posner); Lindgren, supra note 8, at 697-99 (same); Posner, supra note 5, at 1823-28, 1835, 1841 
(surveying arguments for and against blackmail as a means of private law enforcement and concluding 
that they are not strong or certain enough to warrant legalization). 
16 See Block & McGee, supra note 8, at 584, 587; Isenbergh, supra note l ,  at 1918-19, 1931-32. 
Berman rejects this point. Berman, supra note 1, at 807. 
17 See Altman, supra note 4, at 1659; Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 11, at 1860; Isenbergh, 
supra note 1, at 1914-15, 1924-26; Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 43; Levin, supra note 3, at 12; 
McAdams, supra note 5, at 2246-49, 2268; Murphy, supra note 5, at 164-65. But see Coase, supra 
note 11, at 674 (while the prohibition of blackmail discourages wasteful investigations, this benefit by 
itself does not justify criminalization); Kipnis, supra note 1, at 20 ("Although some might worry that 
[the financial incentives of engaging in legalized blackmail] would unleash battalions of privacy­
invading investigators, Block reminds us that our tabloids and private detective agencies have already 
loosed these legions upon us."). Lindgren rejects this proposal because of the possibilities of 
"adventitious" or "opportunistic" and ''participant" blackmail. Lindgren, supra note 5, at 601; 
Lindgren, supra note 1, at 911; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 689-91, 694. Neither kind of blackmail 
involves information discovered through deliberate effort or investigation. Rather, the former involves 
information discovered accidentally, and the latter involves information learned through participation 
in the very same activity. See Berman, supra note 1, at 803-04, 806-07, 837; Boyle, supra note 11, at 
1474-75. 
18 A number of scholars endorse this point. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 85 
(1974) (blackmail constitutes an unproductive exchange because the target prefers either that she had 
not dealt with the blackmailer or that the blackmailer had not existed); POSNER, supra note 1, at 549 
("In the subset of cases in which the [blackmail] threat has no regulatory potential-when its only 
pwpose and effect are to transfer wealth from the victim to the threatener-the case for prohibition can 
. . .  be made. In fact it resembles the case against simple extortion. Both are cases of sterile, in the 
sense of unproductive, wealth transfers, producing a net social loss measured by the value of the 
resources used to make and defend against such transfers."); Altman, supra note 4, at 1643 (if 
blackmail were allowed, everybody would be worse off, conversely, there are few costs to prohibiting 
it); Coase, supra note 11, at 670-74, esp. 673-74; Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 11, at 1865 ("[A] 
legal system designed to maximize allocative efficiency would penalize not only (1) threats to do an act 
that the threatener has no right to do, i.e., that would occasion criminal or civil liability, but also (2) 
threats to do something that the threatener does have a right to do but that would (a) consume real 
resources, and (b) yield no product other than the enjoyment of spite or of an enhanced reputation as a 
credible issuer of threats. Reciprocally, it would not penalize the utterance of a threat to take an action 
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6) it helps to minimize victims' attempts at "self-help"­
namely, retaliating with violence against blackmailers or 
third parties, turning to crime (theft or fraud) to pay off 
their blackmailers, and suicide;19 
7) blackmail causes serious harm (other than or in addition to 
the harms listed above); and/or 
8) blackmail is seriously immoral. 20 
that is (I) lawful in itself, i.e., neither tortious nor criminal, and (2) would confer some material benefit 
on the party making the threat."); Gordon, supra note 7, at 1749-58, 1771-74, 1783-84; McAdams, 
supra note 5, at 2264-91 (while the "ban" on blackmail does not lead to a perfectly efficient 
distribution of information, it still leads to a more efficient distribution of information than legalization 
would); Posner, supra note 5, at 1818 ("[A)Ithough ostensibly a voluntary transaction between 
consenting adults, [blackmail) is likely to be, on average, wealth-reducing rather than wealth­
maximizing."); Scalise, supra note 8, at 1503 ("For unproductive, nonmarket-price blackmail, . . .  
[w]hile one's options appear to increase, in actuality, no increase occurs. Any apparent addition to the 
universe of one's options occurs in form only, not in substance."); Shavell, supra note I I , at 1894-95, 
1897-99 (on balance, blackmail activity on the part of both blackmailers and targets is a "social 
waste"). 
19 See generally Smith, supra note 5, at 862--63, 855--63, 866-84, 894-95, 896-97, 905-14. See 
also Epstein, supra note 5, at 564; Gordon, supra note 7, at 1776-78, 1783; Kipnis, supra note 1, at 21. 
20 Berman and Lindgren attempt to separate arguments that blackmail is seriously immoral from 
arguments that blackmail leads to serious injuries. Berman, supra note I ,  at 799-833; Lindgren, supra 
note 8, at 680-701. This task is difficult because many arguments seem to fall into both categories. So 
they will simply be lumped all together here. See Altman, supra note 4, at 1640-46, 1648-51, 1661 
(though only some, not all, blackmail threats involve "coercion, exploitation, breached obligation, and 
consequential harms," even relatively innocuous blackmail transactions should still be illegal because 
they are rare, hard to distinguish from the more virulent blackmail threats, and difficult to enforce); 
Berman, supra note I ,  at 798, 833-52 (the blackmail threat itself is strong evidence that the 
blackmailer's threatened action, whether or not carried out, springs from morally unacceptable motives; 
and morally unacceptable motives in conjunction with actual or threatened harm amounts to a 
criminalizable act); Boyle, supra note II ,  at 1485 ("[W)e do not think that we should commodify 
relationships in the private realm. To commodify is itself to violate the private realm. To commodify a 
violation of privacy, then, is doubly reprehensible." (citation omitted)); A.H . Campbell, The Anomalies 
of Blackmail, 55 LAW Q. REv. 382, 389 (1939) (a transaction is blackmail and should be criminal if the 
proposer surrenders an interest only to make a profit, not to promote a "lawful business interest"); 
Debra J. Campbell, Why Blackmail Should Be Crimina/ized: A Reply to Walter Block and David 
Gordon, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 883, 887-91 (1988) (the target is entitled to non-interference with her 
secret); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1626-28, 1634-35, 1637 (the blackmail transaction generates a 
relationship of domination and subordination); Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 11, at 1873 ("[I]t is 
almost surely against the disruption of social rather than trade relationships that the prohibition of 
blackmail is directed."); Gordon, supra note 7, at 1748--6 1, 1769-70, 1774, 1776-82 (in addition to the 
possible economic and law enforcement problems that legalization would create, blackmail is wrong 
because the blackmailer uses the target merely as a means to her selfish ends and should be 
crirninalized because criminalization provides the victim with "weapons" against the blackmailer­
namely, "counter-leverage" and a righteous "willingness to angrily refuse the blackmailer's demands"); 
Gorr, supra note 5, at 46 ("If it is wrong for me to harm you or your property, then it is generally wrong 
for me to seek advantage by threatening such harm." (citation omitted)); lsenbergh, supra note 1, at 
1921 ("[W]hat is ultimately at issue in the prohibition of blackmail is transaction costs. There is no 
other way to explain the law of blackmail."); Katz, supra note 1, at 1595-1601, 1605-06 Gust like a 
robber, the blackmailer uses "swinish" threats to steal from her target); Lamond, supra note I ,  at 216, 
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This Article will not discuss these proposals in any further detail 
because they have already been amply covered in the literature?1 But as a 
234, 237-38 (blackmail produces the harm of interfering with the target's control or personal autonomy 
without her valid consent); Lindgren, supra note 1 1 , at 1706-07 (the blackmailer uses leverage that 
belongs to somebody else); Lindgren, supra note 5, at 606 n.34 (same); Lindgren, supra note 7, at 36, 
38, 40-43 (same); Lindgren, supra note l, at 923 (same); Lindgren, supra note 8, at 672, 694, 702--04 
(same); McAdams, supra note 5, at 2249-64, 2278-86 (blackmail reduces or minimizes internalization, 
adjudication, refinement, criticism, reform, and enforcement of norms); Owens, supra note 5, at 507-
13 (blackmail should be illegal because (a) generally speaking, the target cannot be reasonably certain 
that the blackmailer is the only one who knows her secret, that these others will not disclose it, and 
therefore that this particular blackmail transaction will succeed in delivering the benefit that she 
desires-namely, non-disclosure of her secret; (b) it is therefore irrational for the target to enter into 
such a transaction; and (c) the state should prohibit transactions into which it is irrational for at least 
one party to enter); Waldron, supra note 14, at 8 (the blackmailer should be punished "for exploiting 
the community's sense of wrongdoing and turning that to his own advantage, even when that sense of 
wrongdoing is misplaced or misapplied."); Williams, supra note 8, at 165, 168-70, 241--43 (blackmail 
should be illegal if and only if the threat is not motivated by an honest belief that the demand is 
justified). See also generally Feinberg, supra note 5 (while the criminalization of blackmail threats can 
sometimes be justified because they are exploitative, there are different categories of blackmail threats, 
one of which should be legalized and the rest of which should remain illegal on the ground that the 
threatened disclosure is or should be contrary to criminal or civil law). Of course, the relationship 
between (criminal) law and morality is complicated and controversial. Seminal accounts are offered 
by, among others, Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart, Robert Nozick, and Joseph Raz. Within the universe 
of the blackmail literature, see, for example, Lindgren, supra note 7, at 39 ("Although the precise 
relation of morality to criminal law is open to wide debate, most theories of the criminal law emphasize 
morality very heavily . . . .  Most theories combine some notion of immorality with some notion of 
harm, disutility or inefficiency. . . . Immorality matters. . . . Again and again, morality comes up in 
setting the boundaries of the criminal law."); Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at 120 
("I think that the moral and the legal are particularly entwined in the matter of blackmail. It is taken to 
be so odious in part as a result of the educative or symbolic effect of its criminalization. But the 
criminalization of ordinary blackmail can hardly be understood completely apart from the independent 
distaste that such practices create in most people."); see also infra note 84. 
21 For criticisms of (5) generally, see Berman, supra note 1 ,  at 802-14; Boyle, supra note 1 1 ,  at 
1472-77; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 757-58; DeLong, supra note 1 1 , at 1689; Fletcher, supra 
note 1 ,  at 1618; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1806; Isenbergh, supra note 1 ,  at 1920-2 1 ;  Lindgren, supra 
note 14, at 1984-86, 1987; Smith, supra note 5, at 863. For criticisms of (7) generally, see Scalise, 
supra note 8, at 1487-89. For criticisms of (8) generally, see Block, supra note 5, at 236; Block & 
Gordon, supra note 12, at 47. For criticisms of Berman, see R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 765-67; 
Scalise, supra note 8, at 1492-1501.  For criticisms of Brown, see Block, Private Justice, supra note 
12. For criticisms ofCoase, see Block, Private Justice, supra note 12, at 20-21,  27-28; Brown, supra 
note 12, at 1952-53; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 755-56, 764-65; DeLong, supra note 1 1 ,  at 
1674-75; Lindgren, supra note 5, at 599-608. For criticisms of Epstein, see Berman, supra note 1, at 
8 1 5-17; Block, supra note 1 ,  at 7; Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 46--47; Brown, supra note 12, at 
1 958-62; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 760; Katz, supra note 1 ,  at 1 577-78, 1603; Lindgren, supra 
note 1, at 919-22; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 684-87. For criticisms of Feinberg, see Berman, supra 
note 1 ,  at 821-22; Katz, supra note 1 ,  at 1579-80, 1602. For criticisms ofFletcher, see Berman, supra 
note 1, at 824-26; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 764-65, 763-64; Lindgren, supra note 14, at 1978; 
Smith, supra note 5, at 888-90, 897, 908--09. For criticisms of Ginsburg and Shechtman, see R. 
Christopher, supra note 9, at 755-56. For criticisms of Isenbergh, see Block & McGee, supra note 8, 
at 588-90, 597-600. For criticisms of Ginsburg, see Lindgren, supra note 5, at 601; Lindgren, supra 
note 1 ,  at 9 1 1 ;  Lindgren, supra note 8, at 695-97. For criticisms of Gorr, see R. Christopher, supra 
note 9, at 762-63. For criticisms of .Katz, see Berman, supra note 1, at 827; K. Christopher, supra note 
8, at 1 140; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 763-64; Lindgren, supra note 14, at 1 977; Scalise, supra 
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whole, they tend to share one main problem: they do not fully resolve the 
real Blackmail Paradox. While they may or may not provide good reasons 
for thinking that blackmail should be criminalized, they fail to explain why 
the six arguments for legalization are incorrect. At best, then, we are left 
with two entirely opposed columns of arguments-those for 
criminalization and those against-and no means of deciding between 
them. No justification of criminalization can be successful until it provides 
these means. For, again, these six pro-legalization arguments help to 
generate the Blackmail Paradox. Without them, there would be nothing 
contradicting our intuition that blackmail should be criminalized and 
therefore no paradox in the first place. 
What, then, are these six pro-legalization arguments? The first 
argument is simply that legal threatened action entails legal threat; that if 
one may legally perform or refrain from performing a given action, then it 
follows that she may offer to refrain from performing this action in 
exchange for money. The second argument suggests that blackmail does 
not instantiate any type of crime. The closest candidate, attempted theft, 
simply does not work. It cannot be said that the blackmailer is attempting 
to make the target pay for something to which she is already legally 
entitled. For, ex hypothesi, the target is not legally entitled to non­
disclosure of her secret. The third argument suggests that blackmail threats 
are no different than any other legally permissible threat. Many legally 
permissible threats are also profit-motivated and threaten an interest that 
would be perfectly legal to harm. The fourth argument suggests that 
blackmail transactions are no different than any other legally permissible 
economic transaction. The blackmailer simply offers to sell a service­
non-disclosure of the target's secret-for a price that the target is willing to 
pay. The fifth argument suggests that legalization of blackmail would help 
to make blackmail targets better off than they currently are in a system that 
note 8, at 1490. For criticisms of Lindgren, see Altman, supra note 4, at 1653-54; Berman, supra note 
1, at 823-24; Block, Private Justice, supra note 12, at 20-2 1, 27-28; Block, supra note 5, at 237-39; 
Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 52-53; Boyle, supra note 11, at 1481-82; Brown, supra note 12, at 
1964--66; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 767-68; DeLong, supra note 11, at 1680-88; Fletcher, supra 
note 1, at 1624-26; Gorr, supra note 5, at 60; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1792, 1805; Isenbergh, supra 
note 1 ,  at 1917-18; Katz, supra note 1, at 1581, 1602; Scalise, supra note 8, at 1490; Smith, supra note 
5, at 885-87, 907. Block and McGee defend Lindgren against lsenbergh's critique. Block & McGee, 
supra note 8, at 586. For criticisms of McAdams, see Smith, supra note 5, at 911. For criticisms of 
Nozick, see ROTIIBARD, supra note 12, at ch. 29, esp. 245-49; Berman, supra note 1, at 828-32; Block 
& Gordon, supra note 12, at 48-50; Boyle, supra note 11, at 1479-81; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 
753-55; Isenbergh, supra note l, at 1921; Katz, supra note 1, at 1579, 1602-03; Lindgren, supra note 
1, at 910-11; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 699-700; Murphy, supra note 5, at 158-59; Owens, supra note 
5, at 504-05. For criticisms of Posner, see Berman, supra note 1, at 809-10; Block & Gordon, supra 
note 12, at 39-44; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1806; Lindgren, supra note 14, at 1981-82. For criticisms 
of Shavell, see R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 757. For criticisms of Smith, see R. Christopher, supra 
note 9, at 760. 
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criminalizes blackmail. For while a system that criminalizes blackmail 
encourages disclosure over blackmail proposals, a system that legalizes 
blackmail encourages blackmail proposals over disclosure. And blackmail 
targets are more likely to prefer blackmail proposals to disclosure. For 
they would rather have the option of paying for non-disclosure than not to 
have it and simply be doomed to disclosure. Finally, the sixth argument 
suggests that because silence-for-pay transactions that the target initiates 
are legal and because they are substantively the same transactions that the 
blackmailer typically initiates, the latter should also be legal. 
This Article will take up the task that most, if not all, pro-criminalizers 
have only partially accomplished: it will attempt to explain why all of 
these pro-legalization arguments fail. While most of the arguments will be 
critical, it will also incorporate a novel positive justification for 
criminalization into its response to the second argument-i.e., the 
argument that blackmail does not constitute attempted theft or any other 
type of crime. It will argue that while blackmail threats do not qualify as 
attempted theft, there is still another justification for criminalizing them. 
The criminal law is largely concerned with protecting people against 
deliberately inflicted harm to their supremely valued interests, to the 
interests that they generally most highly value-namely life, physical well­
being, emotional well-being, family, liberty, and property. That is why we 
have criminal laws against homicide, manslaughter, rape, assault, battery, 
kidnapping, unlawful imprisonment, and theft. 
The fact that emotional well-being is among the supremely valued 
interests explains why we have criminal laws against menacing, 
harassment, and stalking (not to mention civil laws against intentional 
infliction of emotional distress). Indeed, it is also the second reason that 
we have criminal laws against extortionate threats, laws that are often 
mixed among the larceny, coercion, menacing, harassment, and stalking 
codes. These laws are all designed to protect people, in one way or 
another, frotn undue fear and anxiety. As it turns out, for the same reason, 
there should be laws against threats to reputation. For, like emotional well­
being, reputation is also a supremely valued interest. Its owners tend to 
value it just as much as, if not more than, any of the other supremely 
valued interests (life, physical well-being, etc.). So threats to it are just as 
likely to inflict the same level of fear and anxiety as extortionate threats, 
menacing, harassment, and stalking. And, if this likely consequence is 
sufficient to criminalize these latter kinds of threats, then it is also 
sufficient to criminalize the former kind of threats-i.e., blackmail threats. 
Of course, objections may be raised against this argument. For 
example, one might argue that that reputation must not be as highly valued 
as life, physical well-being, etc. because it is not legally protected in the 
same way that they are. Again, true, but reputation-damaging disclosures 
are perfectly legally permissible. In response to this objection, this Article 
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will suggest that what has kept reputation out of the family of legally 
protected interests is not the fact that it is less highly valued than life, 
physical well-being, etc. Rather, what has kept reputation out of the family 
of legally protected interests is the fact that it happens to have a competitor 
that society happens to regard as even more important-again, freedom of 
speech. Life, physical well-being, etc. were simply lucky enough not to 
have such competitors. So the fact that reputation is not legally protected 
is not an indication that reputation is less highly valued than life, physical 
well-being, etc. Rather, it is a reflection only of the fact that reputation is 
less highly valued than freedom of speech. And this proposition is still 
perfectly consistent with the possibility that reputation is equally, if not 
more, valued than life, physical well-being, etc. 
II. FOUR INITIAL CLARIFICATIONS 
Four initial clarifications are in order. First, blackmail may be 
conceived narrowly or broadly. The narrow conception incorporates only 
informational blackmail-i.e., threats to (a) report incriminating 
information (i.e., information about another's illegal activity) to the 
authorities22 or (b) reveal embarrassing information (i.e., non­
incriminating information that the target has violated a social or moral 
norm and therefore the disclosure of which would likely harm the target's 
reputation) to a third party or parties (e.g., one's lover, spouse, family, 
boss, and/or the public in general).23 The broader conception incorporates 
22 Blackmail threats to report incriminating information include threats to report incriminating 
information about one's legal adversary in order to obtain a more favorable settlement from the 
adversary. I owe this point to Judge Jed Rakoff. 
23 See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF TilE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 
241 (1990) ("In ordinary discourse . . .  blackmail has come to be identified with only one type of 
wrongful coercion, namely the attempt to extract money or advantage by means of a threat to disclose 
information about the victim, which, since it would embarrass or discredit him, he very much prefers to 
keep secret."); RICHARD A POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 283 (1981) ("Blackmail is the 
practice of threatening to disclose discreditable information about a person unless he pays the 
blackmailer to suppress it."); Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 37 (restricting blackmail to "a demand 
for money or other valuable consideration under the threat of exercising one's right of free speech by 
publicizing someone else's secret without use of the threat of force or violence."); Friedman, supra note 
3, at 11 10, 111 1 ;  Gordon, supra note 7, at 1746 (referring to (b) above as "central case blackmail"); 
Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 42 ("Blackmail may be defined as the sale of information to an 
individual who would be incriminated by its publication, and at first glance appears to be an efficient 
method of private enforcement of the law (the moral as well as the positive law)."); Mack, supra note 
12, at 274 (blackmail is "the acceptance of payment (in cash or kind) for not revealing damaging 
information about somebody"); Scalise, supra note 8, at 1485 ("[B]lackmail, in formalistic terms, 
should be defined as an otherwise legal threat to reveal coupled with an otherwise legal demand for 
compensation not to reveal."). Feinberg acknowledges (a) and splits (b) into four different categories: 
(b1) false accusations, (b2) information that an individual has performed legal but "underhanded" 
actions, (b3) information that an individual has performed actions that are perfectly innocent but would 
still be repudiated by others who are "benighted," and (b4) information that an individual, who has now 
reformed her character, previously committed serious indiscretions. See Feinberg, supra note 5, at 85-
2007] THE SOLUTION TO THE REAL BLACKMAIL PARADOX 1067 
both informational and non-informational blackmail.24 Leo Katz argues 
that it is possible to threaten to perform a legal but interest-injuring action 
other than disclosing damaging information.25 Katz's examples include 
threatening to: seduce another's fiance; persuade another's son that it is his 
patriotic duty to volunteer for combat duty in Vietnam; give another's 
high-spirited, risk-addicted nineteen-year-old daughter a motorcycle for 
Christmas; hasten our ailing father's death by leaving the Catholic Church; 
call a strike; flunk another on her exam; and cause bad blood at the next 
faculty meeting.Z6 Still, Katz argues that it is not an accident that the 
literature concentrates on informational blackmail: "Most immoral 
misconduct at the noncriminal level is of an informational nature. If the 
misconduct is more tangible than that, it probably is a crime. If it is less 
tangible than that, it falls below the threshold of serious immorality."27 
Whether or not Katz's explanation is correct, this Article will continue to 
follow the literature's  lead and concentrate on informational blackmail as 
well. 
Second, the blackmail literature tends to distinguish between blackmail 
and extortion. It suggests, if not simply assumes, that, while extortion 
involves a threat to perform an illegal action or legal action by illegal 
means, blackmail involves a threat to perform a legal action by legal 
means.28 It should be noted, however, that this distinction reflects only the 
thinking of contemporary scholars, not contemporary jurisdictions or 
history, according to which blackmail is/was a species of extortion.Z9 
95. Gorr and Scalise follow Feinberg's classification. See Gorr, supra note 5, at 46-48; Scalise, supra 
note 8, at 1 5 1 1 .  
24 Some definitions of blackmail make no mention of information, no less legality/illegality. For 
example, one authoritative source defines blackmail as simply "[a] threatening demand made without 
justification." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 180 (8th ed. 2004). 
25 Katz, supra note 1 ,  at 1567-68, 1569-73, 1 578, 1 58 1 ,  1602; see also Berman, supra note 1 ,  at 
852, 866-67; Lamond, supra note l ,  at 216; Lindgren, supra note 1 ,  at 923. 
26 Katz, supra note 1, at 1567-68; see also Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1619. 
27 Katz, supra note 1, at 1 603. 
28 See Alldridge, supra note 13, at 370-71 ;  Berman, supra note 1 ,  at 806-07, 853; Block, Private 
Justice, supra note 12, at 13;  Block, supra note 1 ,  at 4; Block, supra note 8, at 61-62; Block & Gordon, 
supra note 12, at 38; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 743-44; Feinberg, supra note 5, at 84; Friedman, 
supra note 3, at 1 1 1 1 ; Gorr, supra note 5, at 59; Mack, supra note 12, at 274; Scalise, supra note 8, at 
1 484, 1485, 1506--07, 15 10-1 1 ;  Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 5 1 ;  Smilansky, May We Stop 
Worrying, supra note 9, at 1 1 8 ;  Smith, supra note 5, at 864. 
29 See POSNER, supra note l ,  at 548-49; Alldridge, supra note 13, at 371-73, 381-83; Friedman, 
supra note 3, at l l l l -12; James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: 
From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REv. 8 1 5, 88 1-82 ( 1988). But see FEINBERG, 
supra note 23, at 240 (''The terms 'blackmail' and 'extortion' . . .  were once the names of quite distinct 
crimes."). The Model Penal Code categorizes blackmail under the heading of ''Theft by Extortion." 
See supra note 2; see also Lindgren, supra note 1 1 ,  at 1696 ("Coercive extortion is often called 
blackmail, particularly where hush money is involved, but few blackmail statutes remain on the books. 
Usually, blackmail behavior is covered under extortion, theft, or coercion statutes."); Smith, supra note 
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Third, blackmail threats to disclose embarrassing information cannot 
be illegal simply because they involve "trafficking in private 
information."30 Some perfectly legal transactions involve such trafficking. 
These transactions typically involve either (a) the sale of private 
information (e.g., by private detectives, police informers, and reportersi 1 
or (b) the sale of secrecy (e.g., "an attorney's promise not to disclose the 
confidences of a client, a departing employee's agreement not to disclose 
the trade secrets of an employer, [and] a settling litifant's agreement not to 
disclose what she learned during civil discovery.'').3 
Fourth, it is much easier to explain why blackmail threats to report 
incriminating information are criminalized than it is to explain why 
blackmail threats to report embarrassing information are criminalized.33 
Suppose the following: "Troublemaker" has committed a crime, 
Troublemaker's enemy-"Enemy"-has ample evidence to prove it, and 
Enemy did not herself participate in this criminal activity.34 The criminal 
prohibition against blackmail threats to report incriminating information 
derives from a moral and civic duty on Enemy's  part. This derivation 
proceeds in three parts. First, given that Troublemaker committed a crime, 
it is Enemy's moral, civic, and arguably legal duty to report Troublemaker 
to the authorities.35 And the more morally reprehensible, the more morally 
5, at 862 ("[B]lackmail or extortion can be defined as the obtaining of something of value by means of 
a threat that is not associated with the immediate physical coercion required for robbery."). 
30 Lindgren, supra note 8, at 688. 
31 See Block, supra note I,  at 6; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 688, 692, 705-06. 
32 DeLong, supra note I I , at 1666; see also Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 52-53; Block & 
McGee, supra note 8, at 582; Epstein, supra note 5, at 559, 561;  Hardin, supra note 5, at 1807; 
Isenbergh, supra note I ,  at 1 9 1 3; Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 42-43, 44-46; Lindgren, supra 
note I ,  at 9 1 4-1 5; Owens, supra note 5, at 509. 
33 Waldron, supra note 14, is more ambitious than I am insofar as he tries to provide one, all­
encompassing explanation of why both blackmail threats to report incriminating information and 
blackmail threats to disclose embarrassing information are criminalized. The justification offered here 
for criminalizing blackmail threats to report incriminating information is very different from the 
justification that will be provided in Parts IV.B-C for criminalizing blackmail threats to disclose 
embarrassing information. 
34 This example was borrowed in part from Lindgren, supra note 1 1 , at 1 701,  and Lindgren, supra 
note 29, at 826-27. 
35 Failure to report knowledge of another's crime constitutes misprision of felony. See Clark, 
supra note 9, at 57. For different views of misprision, see Berman, supra note I ,  at 861 ("Modern 
statutes have tended to ignore [misprision of felony] entirely" because silent witnesses may have 
morally acceptable motives-namely, "fear of retaliation, . . . friendship and loyalty toward the 
criminal, and . . .  fear of the police."); Block, Private Justice, supra note 12, at 18 ("Why should a 
person who has committed no crime go to prison for failure to report the misconduct of another? 
Unless he has agreed to do so, this amounts to a draft, in effect forced enslavement, of police 
personnel."); Block, supra note 1 ,  at 8 ("[W]hatever moral duty might be claimed to report the crimes 
of another (and not to profit from them), nevertheless there is no basis for legally requiring that the 
crimes of another should be reported. Such positive duties-like the positive duty to be a good 
Samaritan-have no place in criminal law."); Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 38 n.9 ("Just as the 
law cannot properly compel the individual to be a good Samaritan, so can it not compel him to acquaint 
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and "civically" obligatory. Second, the moral and civic duty to report 
incriminating information entails a moral and civic duty not to conceal this 
information-especially not for the self-serving purpose of making a 
profit.36 Such a profit would come at the expense of the public's interest in 
law enforcement.37 Third, the moral and civic duty not to conceal this 
information for profit is sufficiently important to the public's interest in 
law enforcement that it translates into a legal duty not to conceal this 
information for profit. 
Because this argument adequately explains why blackmail threats to 
report incriminating information are criminalized, the remainder of this 
Article will assume that this issue has been dealt with and focus entirely on 
what is the much harder problem-the question why blackmail threats to 
disclose embarrassing information should also be criminalized. 
the legal authorities with the facts concerning crimes he knows to have taken place. Turning in the 
criminal may thus be an act over and above the call of duty, but it is not an act of duty itself.") ; Block 
& McGee, supra note 8, at 595-96 ( keeping silent about another' s crime, whether or not for 
compensation, does not amount to complicity); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 86-87 ([(a)] misprision of 
felony requires "some affirmative act of concealment"; [(b)] similar to misprision of felony is 
"compounding crime," which involves "accept[ing] money under an agreement not to . . . bring charges 
against, a person [one] knows to have committed a crime"; [(c)] misprision statutes have most likely 
fallen into "desuetude . . .  because of practical difficulties in enforcement, especially fear of underworld 
revenge"; and [(d)] even if we have no legal duty to report incriminating information, we still have a 
civic duty to "cooperate with law enforcement" (internal quotation marks omitted)) ; Scalise, supra note 
8, at 1509 ("The duty to report crime . . .  is very limited . . . .  [It] extends only to those acts which, if 
one did not report, would result in one being rightfully considered an accomplice to the original 
crime."); Waldron, supra note 14, at 8, 12-13, 20-2 1 (agrees with Feinberg that reporting incriminating 
information is a civic duty, lists a number of other civic duties that we have, and suggests that there is 
no reason in principle against criminalizing their violation). 
Lindgren takes two different positions on this issue. On one hand, he states: "[U]nder federal law 
we all have a duty to report people who commit federal felonies. Yet it would still be extortion for a 
private citizen to threaten to report a federal felon unless he is paid off, despite the threatener' s breach 
of his legal duty to report." Lindgren, supra note 1 1, at 170 l. On the other hand, he states: "In most 
j urisdictions, [a church secretary who has been raped by an evangelist] may . . .  threaten to reveal the 
information to the police or the press unless he pays restitution." Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605 & 
n.30. Still, Lindgren' s latter point does not necessarily contradict his former point. For while the 
former concerns federal felonies, the latter concerns state crimes. See Lindgren, supra note 1 1, at 1 70 1 
n.2 1 ;  Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605 n.30. 
36 This last clause arguably lends some support to Berman' s thesis that motives are important in 
accounting for the illegality of blackmail. Berman, supra note 1, at 797-98. 
37 See Feinberg, supra note 5, at 86 ("No citizen can be allowed to barter away his duties for 
personal advantage, or even to offer to do so (the offer in this case being very much like an attempt at 
crime, itself punishable).") ; Friedman, supra note 3, at 1 1 12 ("If a person knows about a crime, she has 
a duty to report it to the authorities, and not to use the knowledge for private gain, selling silence to the 
criminal for cash."); Gorr, supra note 5, at 48, 5 1, 56--57, 62; Isenbergh, supra note 1, at 1927-29; 
Mwphy, supra note 5, at 165;  Smith, supra note 5, at 864-QS . Waldron proposes an alternative 
explanation: the blackmailer should be punished "roughly for the same reason that an enterprising 
trader' s offer to purchase stolen goods should be condemned: he is proposing to make a profi t out of 
someone else' s wrongdoing." Waldron, supra note 1 4, at 7, 1 1-1 8.  Waldron then attempts to broaden 
his theory from situations in which the target has committed wrongdoing to more difficult situations in 
which the target has violated a morally questionable community norm. /d. at 24-30. 
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III. S IX  ARGUMENTS FOR LEGALIZING BLACKMAIL 
This section will explicate the six strongest arguments for legalizing 
blackmail. 
A. Legal Threatened Action Entails Legal Threat 
Walter Block and David Gordon argue that legal threatened action 
entails legal threat.38 As long as the threatened action is legal, the threat 
itself should be legal as well. More precisely, as long as an individual has 
the right to perform or refrain from performing a particular action A, she 
has the right to threaten to perform A. And the right to threaten to perform 
A is equivalent to the right to demand payment in exchange for refraining 
from performing A. 39 
B .  Blackmail Threats Are Not Attempted Theft 
The argument in this section is that the legality of disclosure entails 
that a blackmail threat to disclose does not constitute attempted theft. And 
since attempted theft seems to be the only plausible candidate for the type 
of crime that blackmail might instantiate, blackmail should not be 
criminalized. 
Consider, first, the extortionate threat. The extortionate threat involves 
one of two kinds of illegality. It is either a threat to perform an illegal 
action (e.g., to inflict non-immediate violence) or a threat to perform an 
action that would involve illegal means (e.g., to disclose embarrassing 
information that was illegally obtained).40 It is easy enough to see why the 
actual carrying out of either kind of threat-i.e., extortion itself-is 
illegal.41 For the target's freedoms from violence and invasion of privacy 
38 Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 38. 
39 See id. at 38, 44-45; see also ROTHBARD, supra note 12, at 124; Block, Private Justice, supra 
note 12, at 12; Block, supra note 5, at 225; Kipnis, supra note 1 ,  at 19; Owens, supra note 5, at 504. 
40 Threats to reveal to a third party's private information (e.g., information about one's credit 
rating, social security number, home address, or phone numbers) or representations (photographs or 
recordings) of private activity (e.g., having sex with one's wife or taking a shower) are not commonly 
discussed in the blackmail literature most likely because privacy laws forbid such disclosure or the 
means by which such information or representations were obtained, in which case threats to disclose 
such information or representations constitute extortion rather than blackmail. Kent Greenawalt 
suggests that some threats to perform criminal action�namely, minor criminal actions like trespass­
should be constitutionally protected speech. Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of 
Speech, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1081, 1 100, 1108, 1 121  ( 1984); see also GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 
255. 
41 Black 's Law Dictionary defines extortion as the "act or practice of obtaining something or 
compelling some action by illegal means, as by force or coercion." BLACK'S LAW DICfiONARY, supra 
note 24, at 266. Likewise, the Hobbs Act, 1 8  U.S.C. § 1951  (2000), which is based largely on New 
York's criminal code, states in relevant part: 
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects 
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by 
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or 
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are legally protected. She has the legal right not to have these freedoms 
infringed by others. And this point explains why mere threats to commit 
extortion are illegal. If the extortionist comes along and demands money 
in exchange for continued enjoyment of any of these freedoms, she is 
committing attempted theft. She is attempting to coerce42 the target into 
paying for something to which the target is already legally entitled and 
therefore something for which the target does not have to pay.43 
Now consider a blackmail threat-i.e., a threat to perform an otherwise 
legal action by legal means. The classic blackmailer threatens her target 
with disclosure of true and legally obtained but damaging information 
about the target.44 Like the extortionate threat, this kind of threat is also 
threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a 
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined . . .  
or imprisoned . . .  or both. 
(b) As used in this section-. 
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property 
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of 
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of 
official right. 
See also Block, supra note 5, at 228; Block & McGee, supra note 8, at 571;  Ginsburg & 
Shechtman, supra note 1 1, at 1852, 1 858; Gorr, supra note 5, at 4�; Isenbergh, supra note l ,  at 
1 905-06; Lindgren, supra note 29, at 825; Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 5 1 .  
42 By coerce, I mean presenting a target with the option of either performing a certain action or 
facing a highly probable risk of being subjected to what the coercer correctly believes the target will 
perceive as a harm. The more serious the harm, the more coercive the option (or threat). See Altman, 
supra note 4, at 1 642 ("Threats deprive the recipient of an important option available in some 
alternative situation. . . . The removal of important available options to alter someone's actions is 
coercion."); Comment, Coercion, Blackmail, and the Limits of Protected Speech, 13 1  U. PA. L. REv. 
1 469, 1472-73 ( 1983) ("A coercive speech analysis would justify prosecution of a gangster under a 
criminal coercion statute if the gangster threatened to break a tavern owner's legs unless he voted for a 
certain political candidate. The threat forces the tavern owner to choose between two things-the right 
to be free from physical assault and the right to vote according to individual conscience-when the 
tavern owner has a legitimate claim to both things." (citation omitted)); Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 
1096 ("One person coerces another by putting him under such great psychological pressure that a 
mtional decision is impossible, by creating unfair conditions of choice, or by manipulating belief about 
relevant facts; informing someone of true but disquieting facts beyond one's control is clearly not to ·  
coerce."). 
43 Greenawalt offers a different explanation: 
[A]nother basis for punishing a warning threat is the wrongfulness of the harm 
threatened. If the threatened harm is imminent and could itself achieve the 
threatener's objective, as when immediate physical force is threatened, the threat 
should be viewed like the harm itself, even if the particular threatener is inclined 
naturally to use force to get his way. 
GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 253-54. 
44 If the information that the blackmailer threatened to disclose were false, then the blackmailer 
would be threatening to perform the illegal act of defamation or false accusation, in which case she 
would be not a blackmailer but an extortionist. See Feinberg, supra note 5, at 94; Gorr, supra note 5, at 
47; Lindgren, supra note 5, at 600; Scalise, supra note 8, at 1507-09, 15 13;  Smilansky, Blackmail, 
supra note 9, at 1 5 1 ;  see also ROTHBARD, supra note 12, at 126-28 (stands alone in arguing that libel 
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illegal if it is · conjoined with a demand for money in exchange for 
concealment. But we cannot offer the same kind of justification for its 
criminalization.45 We cannot say that, like extortionate threats, blackmail 
threats also amount to attempted theft. For the blackmailer is not 
attempting to make the target pay to continue enjoying an interest­
freedom from injury to reputation-to which she is already legally entitled. 
The fact of the matter is that the target is not legally entitled to freedom 
from injury to reputation. As long as the blackmailer's information about 
the target is true and legally obtained, she is within her legal rights to 
disclose it to whomever she wants, no matter how much injury this 
disclosure will cause to the target's reputation.46 
The natural response to this argument is: Fine, blackmail is not 
attempted theft. But attempted theft is not the only possible type of crime 
that blackmail might instantiate. There are plenty of other types of crime 
that might work. The problem with this response, however, is that there 
does seem to be any other such type of crime out there. As Walter Block 
should be perfectly legal ( ! !)); Smith, supra note 5, at 877-78 (discussing the connection between libel 
and blackmail). 
45 Contrary to several scholars. See D. Campbell, supra note 20, at 885, 887-92 (blackmail 
transactions start out with a coercive proposal, a proposal that forces the target to choose between two 
of her rights); Evans, supra note 5, at 89 ("[B)Iackmail is illicit because it harms the victim by extorting 
money from him."); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 90-92 (it is not paradoxical to criminalize blackmail 
threats because the threatened action, disclosure, generally violates privacy torts, in which case the 
blackmail threat constitutes "an attempt at theft (by extortion)"); Gordon, supra note 7, at 1769 (''The 
central case blackmailer . . .  seeks to extract something from the victim that is properly the victim's, 
usually money, or to make the victim do something (for example, sleep with him) that is ordinarily a 
behavior that the victim is at liberty not to engage in."); Gorr, supra note 5, at 53, 54 (blackmail 
involving legal but underhanded practices amounts to theft); Murphy, supra note 5, at 159-60 (there is 
a "plausible ring" to the notion that part of what makes the blackmail threat wrong is that it involves 
"trying to sell back to the victim something which is really his already (his life)"); Posner, supra note 5, 
at 1834-35 (in some cases, blackmail is "the economic equivalent of theft"; so we may no more 
legalize blackmail on the basis of its speculated benefits than we may legalize extortion on the basis of 
its speculated benefits). 
46 See Block, supra note l ,  at 5, 8; Block, supra note 5, at 234, 242-45; Block, supra note 8, at 73 
("[B]Iackmail is not akin to theft, not an invasive act, nor threat thereof . . . .  "); Block & McGee, supra 
note 8, at 572 (blackmail and extortion "resemble each other only superficially. They are as distinct as 
rape and seduction or trade and robbery." (citation omitted)); Katz, supra note l, at 1576 ("[The 
robber) sells back what he doesn't own, the victim's life and limb. Not so the blackmailer threatening 
to disclose the victim's infidelity. The victim doesn't own the right to control the blackmailer's 
communications with his wife; the blackmailer does. The blackmailer, unlike the robber, is selling 
something he owns. Or so it seems."); Levin, supra note 3, at 12 (the blackmail target does not "own" 
his marriage; a "voluntary association such as a marriage, terminable by either partner, belongs to 
neither . . . . Nor . . .  is blackmail extortion. . . . Since you have a right not to have your arm broken, 
refrainment from assault is not [the vendor's] to sell. I on the other hand have no duty to refrain from 
showing your wife my videotape. The tape is mine to do with as I please."); Lindgren, supra note 5, at 
599 ("[P)recisely what makes blackmail paradoxical . . .  [is the fact that] the victim does not own or 
control the information."). But see Lindgren, supra note 7, at 37 ("[M]ost states treat blackmail as a 
species of theft . . . . Thus a blackmail threat typically violates the victim's civil right to keep his 
property and be free of duress."). 
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argues, at least according to libertarianism, the only other justifications for 
criminalization in addition to (attempted) theft are other personal and 
property invasions such as fraud and force.47 And they do not work either. 
Blackmail does not necessarily involve fraud, at least not by the 
blackmailer against the target.48 And while it may involve pressure on the 
target to pay for non-disclosure, this pressure does not amount to force or 
coercion. For the target's option of refraining from· paying and thereby 
risking disclosure is not necessarily so horrible that a reasonable person 
could not be expected to choose it.49 So blackmail is a square peg 
47 See, e.g., Block, Private Justice, supra note 12 ,  at I 1 ;  Block, supra note I ,  at 3 .  
48 E pstein argues that blackmai l  should be c riminal because it  i nvolves fraud and deceit. Epstei n, 
supra note 5, at 565�6. But thi s  fraud and deceit is perpetrated not-as is commonly thought-by the 
blackmailer against her target but rather by the target against the thi rd party from whom she wishes to 
hide i nformation. Id at 563�6; see also Alldridge, supra note 1 3 ,  at 369-70 (sympathizing with 
Epstei n's view that the blackmai l target is more morally culpable than the blac kmailer i nsofar as the 
former perpetrates fraud against third parties an d  the latter only asks for payment "for j oining in the 
fraud."); Scalise, supra note 8, at 1515  ("[I] t is arguable that the party engaging in malicious revelation 
does society a service by preventing the continual exercise of fraud upon members of the 
community."); Smith, supra note 5 ,  at 888 (Epstein "foc uses on excessively on the b lackmai ler's 
actions" and neglects the much greater harm that blac kmail i nduces the target to i nflict on others (or 
herself)). 
49 See Block, Private Justice, supra note 12 ,  at I 9-20; Block, supra note I, at 5; Block & Gordon, 
supra note 12,  at 38; Brown, supra note 1 2 ,  at 1950 n.32 ("That the blac kmailee may be fac ed with a 
hard choic e between the consequences of disclosure and paying the blac kmailer does not necessari ly 
make the blac kmai l any more coercive than the choice facing many parties to wholly legi timate 
economic transactions."); Levin, supra note 3 ,  at 1 t ("[1]he sale of silence i nvolves no coercion, for 
however the negotiations for it begin, the buyer remains free to choose between two bundles of goods. 
You can have my silence and be out a certain amount of money, or keep the money and be out one 
marriage. It is your move."); Murphy, supra note 5, at 156 (the blac kmailer's threats are not obviously 
coercive); Posner, supra note 5 ,  at 1 8 1 8  ("Blackmail is, in the usual case, a voluntary transaction 
between competent adults."). But see Berman, supra note 1 ,  at 852 ("(1] he blac kmai l victim is just as 
coerced as the holdup victim."); D. Campbell, supra note 20, at 887-92 (the blackmailer coerces the 
target to c hoose between two rights, her right to her money and her right to keep her secret); Feinberg, 
supra note 5 ,  at 84 (the target's "choice to pay the blac kmailer is considerably less than fully 
voluntary"); Lamond, supra note 1 ,  at 216 ,  218-23 , 232-33, 237-38 (a blackmai ler's threat 
"i nvalidates the victim' s  consenf' to deprivation of property and interference with personal autonomy; 
offers in-depth di scussion of coercion); Lindgren, supra note 14, at 1976, 1977, 1986, 1 988-89 
(sympathizing with Katz' s proposal that coercion, and therefore blackmail, are properly cri mi nalized 
although they "i ncrease[ ] a victi m's options and follow[ ] a vic tim's preferences"); Lindgren, supra 
note 7 ,  at 38 ("Although the victim may agree with the blackmailer, that does not und�rcut society's 
consensus that the blackmailer i s  taking unfair advantage of the victim."). For intermediate posi tions, 
see Altman, supra note 4, at 1641-43, 1 645-46 (while some blackmai l  should be criminal because i t  
i nvolves coercion o r  exploitation, rarer instances of blackmai l that do not involve coercion or 
exploitation should be criminal for independent moral and practical reasons); Scalise, supra note 8, at 
1 504-05 ("While the acquiescence of the blackmailee i s  not a product  of coercion, the blackmailee 
clearly has no reasonable alternative other than to acquiesc e. Bec ause the blac kmai l situati on leaves 
the blackmailee with no reasonable alternative, it c learly limits the liberty of the acquiescing party." 
(internal citation omi tted)). Of course, in order to constitute criminally puni shable coercion, the threat 
must be sufficiently coercive. Consi der, for example, the threat ''your money or I will not like you 
anymore." No matter who the threat-maker is, losing her affection cannot be so bad that the target 
cannot be reasonably expec ted to ri sk losing i t  in order to hold on to her money. See GREENAWALT, 
supra note 6, at 1 00-01 ;  Block & McGee, supra note 8, at 577; Isenb ergh, supra note I ,  at 1 910; Katz, 
supra note I, at 1 597, 1 605-07; Lamond, supra note I, at 223. 
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surrounded by nothing bqt round holes. It does fit  any niche in the 
criminal law. 
As we saw above, the only reason why extortionate threats of non­
immediate violence are criminalized is because they amount to attempted 
theft, attempts to make individuals pay for what they are already legally 
entitled to. No other justification for criminalizing these threats exists. 
Since this justification does not equally apply to blackmail threats to 
disclose embarrassing information, and since this was the most plausible 
such justification, it follows that blackmail must be de-criminalized. 
C. Blackmail Threats Belong to the Family of Legally Permissible Threats 
Blackmail threats seem to fit perfectly well into the larger family of 
legally permissible threats.5° Clearly, blackmail cannot be condemned 
simply on the ground that the blackmailer is making a profit-motivated 
threat. For the permissibility, no less desirability, of making profit­
motivated threats lies at the heart of contract law, capitalism, and power 
negotiations.5 1  Examples of such legally permissible threats include: 
every seller's implicit threat not to sell a given product or service, even if it 
is desperately needed or desired, unless paid the asking price;52 consumer 
pressure through advertising;53 consumer boycotts;54 a seller's threat to sell 
50 Indeed, not all threats are criminal or even immoral See Fletcher, supra note 1 ,  at 1618-19, 
1621; Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 1 108; Lamond, supra note 1,  at 230; Lindgren, supra note 14, at 
1 986; Murphy, supra note 5, at 158; Shaven, supra note 1 1 ,  at 1893-94. 
51 See GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 100; Block, supra note 8, at 72 ("[A]s Adam Smith 
concluded, it is 'not from benevolence' that many economic actors accomplish beneficial, but 
unintended goals. And so it is with the blackmailer."); Murphy, supra note 5, at 160, 166; see also 
Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 1099 . 
52 See FEINBERG, supra note 23, at 240; GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1 00; Altman, supra note 
4, at 1658-59 (''rescue bargains," hard bargains for desperately needed products or services, are not 
exploitative or coercive); Berman, supra note l ,  at 800--02, 8 1 9; Block, supra note 5, at 235-36, 239; 
Boyle, supra note 1 1 , at 1417, 1419, 1428, 1471, 1477; Brown, supra note 12, at 1973; D. Campbell, 
supra note 20, at 886-92 (blackmail cannot be distinguished from legitimate economic transactions on 
the basis that only the former involves threats because the latter may involve threats as well); DeLong, 
supra note 1 1 , at 1 666; Epstein, supra note 5, at 557-58 (explaining why threats are essential to 
successful commerce); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1619, 1625; Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 1 1 , at 
1 849; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1 792-93, 1 795, 1 797, 1 803--05, 1 807, 1813-14 (whether or not "mutual 
advantage" or "exchange" blackmail should be legal depends not on an a priori analysis of individual 
blackmail transactions but rather on an empirical analysis of how blackmail transactions interact with 
laws, institutions, and other kinds of transactions); Isenbergh, supra note 1 ,  at 1 906, 192 1 ;  Lindgren, 
supra note 8, at 701--02 (the "main problem" of the Blackmail Paradox is to explain the difference 
between blackmail and "legitimate bargaining"); Mack, supra note 12; Murphy, supra note 5, at 156-
60 (asking why blackmail threats are illegal when hard bargains are legal); Shavell, supra note 1 1 , at 
1901 (explaining why threats are essential to successful commerce); Smilansky, May We Stop 
Worrying, supra note 9, at 1 1 6-17; Smith, supra note 5, at 865, 892. 
53 See Boyle, supra note 1 1 , at 1477-78. 
54 See Mack, supra note 12, at 28 1-83; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 256-57; Block, 
supra note 8, at 66-68; Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 1 1 1 5; Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra 
note 9, at 1 1 8. Smilansky still sees a psychological difference between the targets of boycotts and the 
targets of blackmail; the rich and powerful are seriously ''frightened" only by the latter. Smi1ansky, 
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to a buyer's competitors if the buyer does not pay the asking price;55 a 
buyer's threat to a seller that she will not buy unless the price is lowered;56 
a company's  threat to extend business into a new area unless potential 
competitors in that area pay it the money that it could expect to make;57 
employers' threats to lay off employees even if these layoffs would impose 
an "intolerable financial burden" on them;58 an em�loyee's  threat to quit 
her job unless she receives a pay raise or promotion; 9 employee strikes for 
better wages or working conditions;60 a neighbor's threat to build or 
maintain a property nuisance unless paid compensation;61 a politician's 
threat to cut funding to groups that do not support her;62 threats of force or 
economic sanctions in international relations;63 prosecutors' threats to 
argue for harsher counts or sentencing unless suspects cooperate;64 and a 
civilian's threat to bring a legitimate lawsuit (i.e., a lawsuit based on a 
genuinely believed "claim of right") unless paid compensation.65 
Blackmail, supra note 9, at 152: Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at l l 8-19. Gorr 
argues that the distinction between blackmail and boycotts cannot be reduced to the difference between 
a threat of harm and a threat of withholding benefits. Gorr, supra note 5, at 58. 
55 See Epstein, supra note 5, at 557; Isenbergh, supra note I, at 1906; see also Block & McGee, 
supra note 8, at 571 ;  Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 1 1 , at 1849. 
56 Shavell, supra note 1 1 , at 1893. 
51 See A.H. Campbell, supra note 20, at 388, 390. Smilansky thinks that this threat is arguably 
blackmail. See Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 5 1 ;  Srnilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra 
note 9, at 1 1 7-18. 
58 See Boyle, supra note 1 1 ,  at 1478; Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at 1 18 .  
59 See A.H. Campbell, supra note 20, at 388; Coase, supra note 1 1 , at 664; Isenbergh, supra note 
1 ,  at 1906; Williams, supra note 8, at 1 72. 
60 See GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1 00; Williams, supra note 8, at 1 72. 
61 See KATZ, supra note 8, at 133; NOZICK, supra note 1 8, at 84-85; ROTHBARD, supra note 12, 
at 246 (using this point to criticize Nozick); Berman, supra note 1, at 866 n.230 (admitting that this 
situation may constitute an exception to his evidentiary theory of blackmail); A.H. Campbell, supra 
note 20, at 388; Coase, supra note 1 1 , at 664, 670-7 1 ;  Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 1 1 , at 1861-
64; Goodhart, supra note 7, at 440; Isenbergh, supra note l, at 1906, 1 920-22; Lindgren, supra note 8, 
at 696, 701 ;  Shavell, supra note I I ,  at 1893-94; Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 52; WiJliams, 
supra note 8, at 172. Isenbergh points out that "if [the blackmailer] has no interest in building for its 
own sake and wants only to profit from selling an easement to [the target], [the blackmailer]' s  
announced intention to build is blackmail as defined in the Model Penal Code." Isenbergh, supra note 
l ,  at 192 1-22. Block and McGee criticize Isenbergh on this issue. Block & McGee, supra note 8, at 
571 ' 590-91 .  
62 See Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 52; Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 
9, at 1 1 8. 
63 See sources cited supra note 62. 
64 See Hardin, supra note 5, at 1790-91. 
65 See Block, supra note 8, at 72; A.H. Campbell, supra note 20, at 387-88; Fletcher, supra note 
1, at 1618; Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605; Lindgren, supra note 1 ,  at 910-l l ,  920; Lindgren, supra 
note 8, at 688, 71 3-14; Shavell, supra note 1 1 , at 1893, 1901; Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 
!52; Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at 1 1 8; Smith, supra note 5, at 880; Waldron, 
supra note 14, at 17-18; Williams, supra note 8, at 1 64-68; see also Berman, supra note 1, at 863 
(threats to bring legitimate lawsuits are more morally acceptable in civil Jaw than in criminal law); 
Gordon, supra note 7, at 1776 (referring to "anecdotal evidence . . .  suggesting that persons threatened 
with blackmail may have some hope of maintaining confidentiality even if they report the crime."); 
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Blackmail threats belong in this list because they share the same basic 
characteristics: they too (a) are profit-motivated, or at least self-interest­
motivated, and (b) threaten actions that are perfectly legal to carry out.66 
D. Blackmail Constitutes an Ordinary Economic Transaction 
It has been argued that the transaction between the blackmailer and the 
target is wasteful and inefficient-an "unproductive exchange" in Robert 
Nozick's words.67 Blackmail transactions are thought to be wasteful and 
inefficient because only one of the two parties receives a positive benefit 
from the blackmail transaction. While the blackmailer profits, the 
blackmail target suffers net harm. She has (a) paid money and (b) gained 
nothing; her secret is just as concealed before the transaction as afterward. 
But this argument assumes without justification that the proper 
baseline against which to compare the target's present situation (after 
paying off the blackmailer) is the target's situation before the blackmailer 
threatened her. One might very plausibly argue that the proper baseline 
should instead be the target's situation just after the blackmailer threatened 
her. Compared with this situation, the target is better of[ after she pays off 
the blackmailer. Indeed, the notion that the blackmailer's proposal is a 
threat obscures the fact that it is equally an offer-an offer to conceal the 
reputation-damaging information if payment is made.68 Just as with any 
other economic transaction, the target is being offered something that she 
desires-in this case, concealment-in exchange for payment. So if she 
accepts this offer, she is arguably better off than she would have been in a 
situation where the blackmailer knew her secret and she did not receive the 
blackmailer's agreement to conceal.69 
Landes & Posner, supra note 1 5, at 43 (referring to this threat as "lawful bribery"); Posner, supra note 
5, at 1828 (threatening to bring a civil lawsuit unless paid off is less likely to be considered blackmail 
than threatening to report incriminating information unless paid off because the former allows the 
defendant a greater opportunity to maintain confidentiality). 66 If this argument were correct, blackmail threats would be constitutionally protected · speech. 
But Greenawalt argues that blackmail threats are not protected speech because they are "situation­
altering" and situation-altering speech is not supported by any of the various justifications underlying 
freedom of speech. Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 109 1-95, 1098-l lOO, l l03. 67 See proposition (5), supra note 21 ,  and accompanying text. 68 For two different accounts of the difference between threats and offers, see Katz, supra note l ,  
at 1574 (the distinction between threats and offers is that while the former "shrink" the target's 
opportunity set, the latter enlarge the target's opportunity set); and Lamond, supra note l ,  at 225-27 
(what distinguishes threats and offers is that offers anticipate welcome consequences and threats 
anticipate unwelcome consequences, where welcomeness or unwelcomeness is to be analyzed terms of 
the target's subjective interests or desires (for positive actions) and objective baselines or norms (for 
omissions)). 
69 See GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 99; ROTHBARD, supra note 12, at 246 ("Jones is paying not 
for Smith's making him better off, but for not making him worse off. But surely the latter is also a 
productive contract, because Jones is still better off making the exchange than he would have been if 
the exchange were not made."); Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 38-39 ("The payment extracted 
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One might object that while the blackmail target pays for concealment, 
which is a kind of omission., the buyer in an ordinary economic transaction 
pays for a positive something, either a product or service.70 But this point 
fails to undermine the argument above because (a) the blackmailer's 
omission to disclose is itself a service and (b) it is perfectly legal in some 
situations for people to pay others to preserve their secrets. As was 
mentioned in Part II, clients pay their attorneys, among other things, to 
preserve their confidences, and employees formally agree that they will not 
directly or indirectly reveal their employers' trade secrets to their 
employers' competitors. Moreover, Richard Posner points out that it is 
perfectly legal to "conduct research into people's pasts and sell the results 
to the newspaper."71 So why should it be any less legal, no less criminal, 
to try to sell such research to the subject herself?72 
E. Legalization Would Help to Make Blackmail Targets Better Off 
The argument in Part ill.D above was that blackmail transactions 
(legal or not) help to make blackmail targets better off than they were prior 
must be worth Jess to the victim than the costs of having his secret uncovered."); Evans, supra note 5, 
at 92 ("[H]ow can it be illegal to give the victim the choice of being put in a better position than if the 
blackmailer had harmed him in a lawful manner?"); Hardin, supra note 5, at 1 806; Katz, supra note 1 ,  
at 1598 ("If revealing [another's marital] infidelities is only a minor immorality, then how can the 
taking of money which the victim prefers to that minor immorality be anything more than a minor 
immorality itself?"); Levin, supra note 3, at 12 ("In fact, the straying husband does get something from 
the blackmailer: better odds that his wife will stay with him than would obtain without the 
blackmailer's silence."); Lindgren, supra note 8, at 691 (a successful blackmail transaction is arguably 
Jess an invasion of privacy than actual disclosure); Owens, supra note 5, at 502. According to some 
scholars, whatever we might think about "ordinary" blackmail, "market-price" blackmail-the situation 
in which an author offers the subject of her prospective publication "market price" in exchange for 
omitting embarrassing information about the subject-constitutes an ordinary economic transaction and 
therefore should be legalized. See ROTHBARD, supra note 12, at 125; Berman, supra note 1 ,  at 857-60 
(after offering a complicated analysis of market-price blackmail, concluding: ''the particular reasons for 
legalizing the unconditional sale by [the blackmailer] to [a tabloid] should, on consequentialist 
reasoning, entail also legalizing the conditional sale offer by [the blackmailer] to [the target]."); 
Murphy, supra note 5, at 164-65 (market-price blackmail transactions should be legalized for "public 
persons"). But see POSNER, supra note 1 ,  at 546-47 (supporting this argument but calling it 
"incomplete" because it ignores blackmail's "regulatory aspect"); Altman, supra note 4, at 1647-49 
(while market-price blackmail, not to mention ''payer-initiated bargains," is "less wrong than most 
blackmail," it should still be prohibited for "prophylactic reasons"-i.e., because such transactions are 
(a) hard to detect or distinguish from regular blackmail and (b) difficult to enforce); Lindgren, supra 
note 8, at 693-94 (criticizing Murphy's theory). Other scholars who discuss market-price blackmail 
include: Owens, supra note 5, at 501-{)3; and Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at 1 16-
17. 
70 See Gorr, supra note 5, at 58 (while the blackmailer threatens to cause harm (the flip side of 
which is offering to refrain from inflicting this harm for money), the selJer in an ordinary commercial 
transaction threatens (only) to withhold a positive benefit (the flip side of which is offering to confer 
this benefit for money)). 
71 POSNER, supra note 23, at 284. 
72 Id 
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to the transactions. For they gain something that they did not have before 
making payment-namely, the blackmailer's agreement to conceal their 
secret. The argument in this section is that legalization of blackmail 
transactions would make blackmail targets better off than they are in the 
current system, a system that criminalizes blackmail. For, whether or not 
blackmail is legal, there will always be a huge market for reputation­
damaging information about not only public figures but also many private 
individuals as well.73 And how this market operates will largely depend on 
whether or not blackmail is legal. On the one hand, if there is a law against 
blackmail, then many would-be blackmailers will simply bypass the targets 
and instead go straight to the public with their reputation-damaging 
information. On the other hand, if there were no law against blackmail, 
then these same would-be blackmailers would be much more likely to offer 
their targets secrecy in exchange for money. And many, if not most, 
targets would prefer the latter situation. For in the latter situation, they at 
least have the option of purchasing non-disclosure. In the former situation, 
they have no such option. 74 
73 See Lindgren, supra note 8, at 691-93; Mack, supra note 12, at 280-8 1.  All else being equal, 
we are generally a bit less sympathetic to public figures than we are to private individuals. There are 
three reasons. First, we tend to think that public figures assumed the risk when they entered the public 
arena with the knowledge that, by so entering, they would risk exposing their lives and mistakes to the 
world. Second, we may be jealous of their fame, power, and money. Third, rightly or wrongly, we 
regard this fame, power, and money as legitimate compensation for their consequent loss of privacy. 
74 See ROTHBARD, supra note 1 2, at 1 24-25; Altman, supra note 4, at 1650; Berman, supra note 
I ,  at 828-29; Block, supra note 8, at 63, 69; Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 39; Block & McGee, 
supra note 8, at 584; Boyle, supra note I I , at 1475, 1480; DeLong, supra note 1 1 ,  at 1 663-64, 1673 
(this argument is what makes the Blackmail Paradox a paradox); Gordon, supra note 7, at 1 779 {this 
argument depends on the "image" of a blackmail victim who prefers payment to disclosure and 
surreptitiously ignores the image on which the prohibition of blackmail rests-namely, "one who is put 
into mental pain and fear by blackmail threats, but who will nevertheless have no truck with 
dishonor."); Gorr, supra note 5, at 62 ("Although . . .  we would have to acknowledge that there are 
likely to be some regrettable instances in which the victim will be disadvantaged by a ban on 
blackmail, such a ban is still justified since permitting blackmail would almost certainly produce far 
more injustice."); Hardin, supra note 5, at 1 794; Katz, supra note 1 ,  at 1595-97 (the blackmailer is 
blameworthy even if she accommodates the target's preference and allows her to purchase silence or 
non-disclosure); Lindgren, supra note 14, at 1987 (market-price blackmail is still blackmail and 
therefore should still be illegal); Mack, supra note 1 2, at 275; Murphy, supra note 5, at 158-59, 1 60, 
1 64-65 (accepting this argument to some extent); Owens, supra note 5, at 501-02; Posner, supra note 
5, at 1 841;  Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 5 1 ;  Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 
9, at 1 1 7. 
Notice, this argument assumes that the reputation-damaging information in question is not 
something that citizens clearly have a right to know, information such as the fact that a public official 
violated her public duty. For legalizing blackmail in these situations would violate citizens' right to 
know. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 165. Lindgren criticizes Murphy on this point. Lindgren, supra 
note 8, at 694. 
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F. If Target-Initiated Blackmail is Legal, then Blackmailer-Initiated 
Blackmail Should Also Be Legal 
As blackmail statutes stand, Blackmailer cannot be guilty of blackmail 
unless she initiates the blackmail transaction. So if Target correctly 
believes that Blackmailer possesses damaging information about Target, 
approaches Blackmailer, offers to purchase Blackmailer's silence, and 
Blackmailer agrees, no crime has taken place. Target has committed a 
form of legal bribery. But if such a transaction is legal, then the reverse 
transaction-i.e., the transaction in which Blackmailer first approaches 
Target and offers to keep silent about Target's secret in exchange for 
money-should also be legal. For they are substantively the same 
transaction. It does not matter who first approached whom. That is merely 
a formal consideration. What matters is that, in both situations, Target is 
equally purchasing Blackmailer's silence.75 
IV. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE SIX ARGUMENTS FOR 
LEGALIZING BLACKMAIL 
This section will challenge the six arguments in Part III for legalizing 
blackmail. 
1s See DeLong, supra note 1 1 ,  at 1664-65 ((a) no solution to the Blackmail Paradox can be 
successful unless it also solves the " second paradox of blackmail"-i.e., provides an explanation of 
why target-initiated bribery is legal when it is substantively the same transaction as blackmailer­
initiated blackmail, which is illegal; (b) none of the extant economic justifications of blackmail's 
criminalization satisfy this criterion; and therefore (c) none of the extant economic justifications solves 
the Blackmail Paradox). For responses to DeLong' s argument-Qr at least to this kind of argument­
see ROTIIBARD, supra note 12, at 129-30 ("Legally, there should be a property right to pay a bribe, but 
not to take one," for it is usually only the bribe-taker who violates some contractual obligation to a third 
party); Berman, supra note I, at 867-70 (arguing that DeLong's '" pu zzle' .. . is not very puzzling" on 
the basis that bribery should not ordin arily be cri minalized); Gorr, supra note 5, at 63-64 (initiation is 
an indication of whether or not the individual who presetved the sec ret in e xchange for money intended 
to blackmail the vic tim and therefore to whether or not the transaction counts as blackmail); Lamond, 
supra note l, at 235 ("The e xplanation of why it is significant whic h party initiates the transaction 
follows from the role of threats in constituting the wrong in blac kmail. Where [the target] initiates the 
transaction there is no reason to question the validity of her conse nt to that transaction."); Lindgren, 
supra note 14, at 1 979-80 ((a) the answer to DeLong' s argument "may lie in coercion or the threat" 
and (b) "an exploitation theory should be able to handle it fairly easily"); Posner, supra note S, at 1836 
("[E]conomic analysis may explain why it is not blackmail for a person who gets wind that another is 
about to disclose damaging information about him to approac h that pe rson and pay him to keep mum. 
Allowing suc h transac tions is unlikely to give rise to an industry of dirt-seekers, with all the squandered 
resources thereby implied, since the dirtseekers could not advertise for or otherwise see k out customers 
(which would be blackmail) but would have to wait for the latter to come upon them by chance."); 
Smith, supra note S, at 908 ("[T] he legality of [target-initiated] transactions make s se nse. If the 
potential victim feels secure enough to initiate the transaction, there is more reason to think the vic tim 
is not the type to undertake violent self-help. "). For critiques of most of these responses, see K. 
Christopher, supra note 8, at 1 1 37-44. 
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A. We Have No Reason to Believe that Legal Threatened Action Entails 
Legal Threat 
As was pointed out in the Introduction, what generates the Blackmail 
Paradox is the fact that threats and threatened actions normally have the 
same legal status. Block and Gordon go one step further and argue that 
this correlation must be the case, that the legal status of the threatened 
action entails the legal status of the threat. 76 But, first, it is not clear why 
they hold this principle and not the converse-namely, that the legal status 
of the threat entails the legal status of the threatened action, in which case 
the illegality of blackmail threats rather than the legality of disclosure 
would be the starting point. 
Second, Block and Gordon's  point is less an argument than a 
stipulation. They do not support their point that one entails the other; they 
simply assert it. To be sure, if they were correct, they would have proven 
that blackmail threats should be legal. But we have no reason to believe 
that they are correct in the first place. We have no reason to believe that 
there is an entailment relation rather than simply a virtually, but not fully, 
exceptionless correlation between the legal statuses of threats and their 
threatened actions. Until such a reason is given, we may conclude that 
Block and Gordon's point at best restates the Blackmail Paradox rather 
than solves it.77 
B. The Central Argument: Blackmail Threats Should Be Criminalized­
and Therefore Do Not Belong to the Family of Legally Permissible 
Threats-Even Though They Do Not Qualify as Attempted Theft 
The argument in Part ill.B above suggests that there are two different 
families of interests. Into the first family fall interests of which our 
continued enjoyment is legally protected. Call this the "LP"-"Legally 
Protected"-family. They include such interests as life, physical well­
being, emotional well-being, family, liberty, and property. Into the second 
family fall interests either (a) that one does not already enjoy or (b) to 
which her continued enjoyment is not legally protected. These interests 
include affordable products and services (for consumers); freedom from 
competition (for buyers and sellers); freedom from being sued (for 
citizens); freedom from consumer boycotts, strikes, and employee 
shortages (for businesses); pay raises, promotions, and freedom from firing 
(for employees); freedom from governmental funding cuts (for funding 
recipients); and freedom from force or economic sanctions (for countries). 
Call this the ''NLP"-''Not Legally Protected"-family of interests. To be 
sure, they may be regulated with regard to time, place, and manner. But 
76 See supra notes 38, 39. 
77 For another critique ofB1ock & Gordon, see generally Lindgren, supra note 7. 
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they are not protected to nearly the same degree as life, physical well­
being, emotional well-being, family, liberty, and property. 
Why, then, do life, physical well-being, etc. find themselves in the LP 
family rather than in the NLP family? This is certainly not an arbitrary 
categorization. It is not as though we could easily "pluck" one or more of 
these out and throw them into the NLP family with any ethical or rational 
impunity. There is a deeper reason underlying the superficial legal fact 
that these interests are legally protected and that those in the NLP are not. 
But what might this deeper reason be? What distinguishes life, physical 
well-being, etc. from all of those interests in the NLP family-and 
therefore the deeper reason in virtue of which these interests enjoy legal 
protection when the NLP interests do not-is quite simple: LP interests are 
generally more valuable to their owners than NLP interests. They are 
simply on two different "value tiers." On the one hand, LP interests are on 
the top value tier-generally supremely valued (or cherished or venerated) 
by their owners and rarely, if ever, in competition or conflict with 
another's supremely valued interests. That is, it is rarely the case that one 
confronts the situation where she may continue to enj oy her LP interests 
only at the expense of another individual's LP interests. On the other 
hand, NLP interests are on the second value tier. They are generally highly 
valued, but simply not to the same degree as LP interests, and they are 
often in competition or conflict with other individuals' equally highly 
valued NLP interests. It is often the case that one may enjoy or continue to 
enjoy her NLP interests only at the expense of another's NLP interests. 
It follows from this distinction between LP interests and NLP interests 
that there are not just one but two different justifications for criminalizing 
threats to LP interests. The first we already saw in Part III.B above. 
Extortionate threats against another's life, physical well-being, etc. are 
illegal because they constitute attempted theft. They attempt to coerce the 
target into paying for something to which she is already legally entitled­
the continued enjoyment of the particular interest being threatened. But 
there is a second justification for punishing extortionate threats. fudeed, it 
is a justification that also applies to three other crimes as well-menacing, 
harassment, and stalking. These kinds of acts are criminalized primarily 
because they involve the reasonable likelihood, and often the intent, of 
putting the target into a state of great fear and anxiety.78 And criminal law 
78 In New York, the Jaws against menaciilg are designed to protect people from "reasonable fear 
of physical injury, serious physical injury or death" and "fear of death, imminent serious physical 
injury or physical injury." N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.14, 120.15 (McKinney 2004). The Jaws against 
harassment are designed to protect people from "reasonable fear of physical injury" and "annoyance or 
alarm." !d. § §  240.25, 240.26, 240.31, 240.32. And the Jaws against stalking are designed to protect 
people from "reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or property of such person, 
a member of such person's immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted"; 
"material harm to the mental or emotional health of such person"; "reasonabl[e] fear that his or her 
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rests in part on the bedrock assumption that people are entitled-qua 
people, qua members of the moral community-to freedom from this kind 
of deliberately inflicted harm to their emotional well-being. 
Why would the criminal law care about people's emotional well-being 
in the first place? Again, the criminal law is largely concerned with 
protecting people against deliberately inflicted harm to their supremely 
valued interests. And, as we have already seen above, emotional well­
being is supremely valued by most people. Again, the other supremely 
valued interests are life, physical well-being, family, liberty, and property. 
Indeed, that is why we see the criminal law protecting people against 
deliberately inflicted harm to these interests in the form of criminal laws 
against homicide, manslaughter, rape, assault, battery, kidnapping, 
unlawful imprisonment, and theft. 
If this argument is correct, and if reputation qualifies as a supremely 
valued interest, then threats to reputation should also be criminalized. 
Well, as it turns out, reputation does qualify as a supremely valued interest. 
For better or worse, reputation is generally supremely valued by its 
owners-just as much, if not more in many cases, than life, physical well­
being, family, liberty, and property. Many people would rather give up 
their money, freedom, and even their lives or "right arms" than lose their 
reputations. Indeed, that is why we have civil laws against defamation­
i.e., against dissemination of false, reputation-damaging information-and 
sometimes even criminal laws against maliciously ruining a person's 
reputation with true information.79 So threats against reputation are likely 
to put the target into as much, if not more, fear and anxiety than threats 
against these other supremely valued interests. And if this likely 
employment, business or career is threatened"; "reasonabl[e] fear [ot] physical injury or serious 
physical injury, the commission of a sex offense against, or the kidnapping. unlawful imprisonment or 
death of such person or a member of such person's immediate family''; and "reasonable fear of physical 
injury, serious physical injury or death." Id. §§ 120.45, 120.50. 
19 For example, N.Y. Penal Law §§ 135.60 (McKinney 2004) and 155.05 (McKinney 1999), both 
indicate that "an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt 
or ridicule" constitutes grounds for criminal punishment. For statutory text, see supra note 2 and 
accompanying text (emphasis added); see also ROTHBARD, supra note 12, at 121 ("The current libel 
laws make [dissemination of a truthful statement] illegal if done with 'malicious' intent, even though 
the information be true."); Bennan, supra note 1, at 843-44 (prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), "a majority of states had constitutional or statutory 
provisions" according to which defendants who had disclosed embarrassing information about others 
were subject to prosecution for criminal libel even if the information was truthful if these disclosures 
were not "published with good motives and for justifiable ends''); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 90, 93-94 
((a) in the United States, there is (and should be) a tort for public disclosure of private information 
about another "even though it is true and no action would lie for defamation"; and (b) this tort requires 
at least four conditions to be satisfied: public disclosure, the damage consists in the public disclosure, 
the public does not have a "legitimate interest in having the information made available," and the 
information "would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities"). 
2007] THE SOLUTION TO THE REAL BLACKMAIL PARADOX 1 083 
consequence in conjunction with the moral assumption that people do not 
deserve deliberately inflicted damage to their emotional well-being is 
sufficient to criminalize extortionate threats, menacing, harassment, and 
stalking, then it is also sufficient to criminalize threats to reputation-i.e., 
blackmail. 80 
The most obvious objection against the position that reputation 
qualifies as a supremely valued interest is that it does not fall into the LP 
family. Rather, it falls squarely into the NLP family. We generally enjoy 
it, but, again, we are not legally entitled to its continued enjoyment-i.e., 
to freedom from the non-disclosure of true but reputation-damaging 
information. We are at most entitled only to freedom from the non­
publication of false reputation-damaging information. This much seems 
right.8 1  But it is not conclusive. For (a) what puts reputation into the NLP 
family and keeps it out of the LP family is merely a superficial legal fact; 
and (b) there is a deeper, normative reason why reputation should be 
treated with the same reverence as members of the LP family. 
Regarding (a), the superficial legal fact that puts reputation into the 
NLP family and keeps it out of the LP family is society's determination 
that the institution of freedom of speech outweighs or "trumps" the harm 
that some true disclosures may do to people's reputations. This fact is 
superficial because it does not reflect the intrinsic value or worth of 
reputation, only a contingent societal judgment about the relative weights 
of reputation and freedom of speech. I say contingent because it does not 
strain reason to think that society might very well have adopted the reverse 
judgment and made truthful but reputation-damaging disclosures illegal. 
Indeed, as indicated just above, some states do prohibit true, reputation­
damaging disclosures that are maliciously motivated. 82 
Regarding (b), reputation is generally also supremely valuable to its 
owner. It is just as valuable, if not more so, to its owner as life, physical 
well-being, etc. So while reputations seem to meet the "letter" of the NLP 
family, they meet the deeper normative "spirit" of the LP family. While a 
superficial societal judgment denies them certain legal protection, they are 
normatively of a kind with other supremely valued interests. As a result, a 
blackmailer' s threat against a target's reputation is morally equivalent to a 
80 See Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 1 1 1 5 ("In the ordinary situation in which a single hann, say 
disclosure of embarrassing infonnation, is threatened, a judgment may reasonably be made that the 
hann itself is socially acceptable, but that a threat to engage in it coupled with a demand puts socially 
unacceptable pressure on the victim to comply with the demand."). 
81 But see supra note 79. 
82 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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threat against any other LP interest. And since the latter is serious enough 
to merit criminal punishment, so is the former. 83 
It is very tempting to think that because . blackmailers threaten legal 
actions (truthful disclosure) and extortionists illegal actions, blackmail is 
not as "bad" or wrong as extortion. But this first appearance is false. 
Blackmail threats are just as wrong as extortionate threats.84 Given that 
reputation may be just as, if not more, socially, economically, and 
psychologically important to its owner than other LP interests, a threat to 
spread reputation-damaging information is arguably more wrongful than a 
threat to kidnap, steal, defraud, vandalize, or, possibly in some more 
extreme cases, even kill or maim. 85 This is why Ronald Coase refers to 
83 See Shavell, supra note 1 1 , at 1903 ("I suspect that most individuals view blackmail as 
deserving of punishment . . .  because blackmail involves the calculated imposition of suffering upon its 
victims."). 
14 One might argue that threats to injure another's reputation (with truthful information) cannot be 
wrong. For disclosure itself is not wrong. And we know that disclosure is not wrong because it is 
perfectly legally permissible. But this argument simply does not work. Just because a given action is 
legally permissible does not mean that it is morally permissible. Even though disclosure is legal, it is 
often morally impermissible. (Conversely, concealment is often morally permissible-contrary to its 
otherwise derogatory connotations. See Lindgren, supra note 1 ,  at 914-16.) Freedom of speech may 
permit revealing another's secrets and thereby embarrassing her. But it does not necessarily make such 
activity right. See Gordon, supra note 7, at 1759, 1764-66 (using the Doctrine of Double Effect to 
show that the fact that the threatened action is legal does not make the blackmailer's threat any less 
wrong); Hardin, supra note 5, at 1808 ("The fact that there is nothing illegal about my actions might be 
the ground for thinking that there is nothing wrong with them . . . But unless the principle of rightness 
or goodness is very broadly conceived, this [Hobbesian or positive law] view is conspicuously false to 
the historical facts of many laws."); Lindgren, supra note 7, at 40 ("[N]ot all immoral behavior is 
criminal. This may be because either the behavior is not sufficiently immoral, it does not cause serious 
enough harm or it is not a traditional concern of the criminal law."); Owens, supra note 5, at SOl (it is 
within the rights of, but not necessarily right for, an editor to publish injurious gossip or to sell it to 
other editors); Waldron, supra note 14, at 23 ("[T]he law recognizes wider categories of wrongdoing 
than it penalizes. The criminal law does not exhaust the legal system's designation of certain actions as 
'wrong' . . . . The law . . .  recognizes certain principles of public morality even though it is not 
prepared-for various reasons-to enforce them directly through the criminal law."). 
85 See POSNER, supra note 23, at 287 ("Reputation . . .  has important economic functions in a 
market system . . . .  It reduces the search costs of buyers and sellers and makes it easier for the superior 
producer to increase his sales relative to those of inferior ones . . . . It is just as vital to the functioning 
of the 'marriage market,' the market in friends, the political market, and so on." (citation omitted)); 
Alldridge, supra note 13, at 375 ("[T]o most men the idea of losing their fame and reputation is 
equally, if not more terrific than the dread of personal injury." (quoting R. v. Hickman, [1784] l Leach 
278)). For an eloquent account of the close connection between reputation and another arguable LP 
interest, privacy, see generally JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF 
PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000). 
This point is not as hard to accept when we consider that some lawful acts can be morally worse 
than some unlawful ones. Indeed, it is arguably morally worse maliciously to drive a company out of 
business, which is sometimes legal, than to steal a few thousand dollars from it, which is always illegal. 
Likewise, if we may be permitted to compare apples and oranges, it is arguably morally worse to 
perform the legal act of refusing to visit one's beloved, fatally ill mother for frivolous reasons than it is 
to perform the criminal act of purchasing marijuana, especially for medicinal purposes. 
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blackmail as "moral murder";86 why Lord C.J. Lane states that "in the 
calendar of criminal offences, blackmail is one of the ugliest . . .  because it 
involves what really amounts, so often, to attempted murder of the souf';87 
and why Bechhofer Roberts states that "blackmail is by many people 
considered the foulest of crimes-far crueler than most murders, because 
of its cold-blooded premeditation and repeated torture of the victim."88 
C. Objections Against My Justification for Criminalizing Blackmail in 
Part IV.B 
Objection 1: Life, physical well-being, etc. are not trumped out of the 
LP family by any social value in the way that reputation is trumped out of 
the LP family by freedom of speech. Therefore life, physical well-being, 
etc. must be more highly valued by their owners, in which case reputation 
does not belong even normatively to the LP family. 
Reply: It is merely a contingent fact that no other social value trumps 
life,  physical well-being, etc. out of the LP family. For example, it is easy 
enough to imagine that society might have decided that national security is 
more important than individual liberty; that, given the tragic events of 
9/1 1 , it would be preferable to restrict, if not eliminate, people's various 
liberties (religious exercise, assembly, privacy, etc.) for the sake of 
safeguarding the nation from spying, terrorist plots, and other hostile 
threats. If this were the case, if liberty had been trumped out of the family 
of LP interests in this way, our individual liberties would have suffered 
dramatically. But we might still continue to value--- indeed, miss-them 
just as much as we value life, physical well-being, emotional well-being, 
and property. The fact that we decided to make national security our top 
priority would not necessarily have made us value individual liberties any 
less than the other LP interests. Likewise, then, with reputation. The fact 
that we value freedom of speech even more than reputation does not 
necessarily mean that we value reputation any less than the other LP 
interests. 
Objection 2: Yes, the ''blackmailer's actions generate fear and 
anxiety."89 But many perfectly legal threats generate fear and anxiety too. 
So why should blackmail threats be singled out? As Walter Block argues: 
Causing anxiety is not, per se, a ground for criminal 
prohibition. A great number of human activities-from 
86 Coase, supra note 1 1, at 675. 
87 Alldridge, supra note 13, at 382 (quoting R v. Hadjou, [1989] 1 1  Crim. App. 29). 
81 Coase, supra note l l , at 674 (quoting THE OLD BAILEY TRIAL SERIES, THE MR. A CASE 9 
(C.E. Bechhofer Roberts ed., 1950)). 
89 Coase, supra note 1 1 ,  at 675; see also Levin, supra note 3, at 12 (blackmail should remain 
illegal because "legal blackmail would create too much anxiety''); Shavell, supra note l l , at 1894, 
1 898. 
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exams to hangliding to investing in the stock market to being 
'victimized' by 'hate' speech-are anxiety-producing, but we 
do not see such anxiety as a legitimate reason for seeking to 
prevent such activities. Almost any change is potentially 
anxiety-producing, and a policy of anxiety reduction would 
be a prescription for maintaining the status quo. If anxiety is 
a problem, it is better to see a psychiatrist.90 
Reply: If Objection 2-and Block's argument-worked, then 
extortionate threats, menacing, harassment, and stalking should not be 
criminalized. For, again, the main reason why these kinds of acts are 
criminalized is because they tend to cause especially high levels of fear and 
anxiety.91 Yet they clearly should be criminalized. So Objection 2 is 
wrong. 
Where, then, does it go astray? There are two significant differences 
between (a) fear-and-anxiety-generating threats or activities that are legal 
and (b) fear-and-anxiety-generating threats that are criminal (i.e., 
extortionate threats, menacing, harassment, and stalking). First, the level 
of fear and anxiety that the latter are thought to generate is significantly 
higher than the level of fear and anxiety thought to be generated by the 
former. Second, while the fear and anxiety generated by legally 
permissible threats or activities may be counter-balanced by a sufficiently 
strong justification-e.g., capitalism, competition, or education-the fear 
and anxiety generated by extortionate threats, menacing, harassment, and 
stalking are not compensated for by any such moral or institutional 
justification. 92 
Objection 3: A person is morally entitled to whatever reputation 
accurately reflects her norm-violations. If, for example, a certain man has 
a reputation for being a faithful husband and yet has cheated on his wife, 
then he is not morally entitled to this reputation. On the contrary, he is 
morally entitled to the very opposite reputation-the reputation of an 
adulterer.93 So it is tough luck if threats to disclose true but reputation-
90 Block, Replies, supra note 12, at 23; see also Lindgren, supra note 5, at 604-05. 
91 See supra note 78. 
92 At least in society's judgment. Legislatures did a balancing test and decided that the pleasure 
that a stalker derives from stalking does not come close to justifying the fear and anxiety that it causes 
the stalker's target. The same is true of blackmail.  Legislatures deemed that the capitalist nature of 
blackmail threats do not justify the fear and anxiety that they cause the blackmailer's target. 
93 See Gorr, supra note 5, at 63 ("[I]t hardly seems likely that [an adulterer] is morally entitled to 
complain" about being exposed); Murphy, supra note 5, at 1 62 (we are not entitled to a good reputation 
if we have performed actions inconsistent with it); Scalise, supra note 8, at 1 508, 1 5 1 1 ("One's right in 
one's reputation is limited to disclosure of acts he has committed and to nondisclosure for acts he has 
not committed. [One] may try to hide the fact that he committed act X, but he cannot be said to have a 
right of nondisclosure concerning act X. . . . While an individual generally has a right to her 
reputation, she does not possess a right to a reputation of a person she is not."). 
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damaging information will cause him severe emotional distress. He is 
getting precisely what he deserves. He made his bed; now he must lie in 
it.94 
Reply: Objection 3 is far too puritanical. It holds people to the very 
difficult, if not impossibly high, standard of acting at all times in complete 
conformity with their unblemished public appearance. A person is not 
necessarily morally entitled to a reputation that perfectly tracks each and 
every one of her norm-violations. The mere fact that one has violated a 
social or moral norm does not necessarily mean that that she deserves 
disclosure of this fact to third parties or the public in general. Indeed, if 
this were the case, most of us would have much worse reputations than we 
currently enjoy.95 Yet most of us who have good reputations still feel that 
we deserve them, despite whatever mistakes we have made or weaknesses 
we may have. 
Whether or not a norm-violator deserves disclosure of embarrassing 
information depends on many different things, including what norm she 
violated, whether or not the norm is morally correct, the internal 
(psychological) and external circumstances under which she violated it, 
how often she has violated it, the magnitude (or egregiousness) of the 
violation, and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of disclosing the 
violation. In many situations, this combination of factors will lead us to 
conclude that the norm-violator does not deserve disclosure and even that 
such disclosure would be morally despicable. 
For example, we may reason that the norm should not be a norm in the 
first place. Consider the stigma that often attaches to homosexuality. 
Many feel that this attitude is morally wrong and therefore that it is 
morally proper to keep homosexuals' sexual orientation a secret rather than 
to disclose it and let them be subjected to unfair discrimination. 
A second example: even if an individual does deserve disclosure, she 
may not deserve the degree of reputation injury that disclosure will cause. 
For the degree of reputation injury is often well out of proportion to the 
norm-violation itself. One need only read Nathaniel Hawthorne's The 
94 Objection 3 actually rests on four unstated assumptions: (a) the husband is responsible for 
cheating, (b) he therefore deserves the reasonably foreseeable consequences of cheating, (c) a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of cheating would be its public disclosure, and (d) a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of public disclosure would be injury to his reputation as a faithful husband. 
95 See ROSEN, supra note 85, at 12 ("[T]he sociologist Erving Goffinan argued that individuals, 
like actors in a theater, need backstage areas where they can let down their public masks, collect 
themselves, and relieve the tensions that are an inevitable part of public performance. In addition to 
protecting freedom and self-expression . . .  the privacy of the backstage protects us from the unfairness 
of being misjudged by strangers who don't have time to put our informal speech and conduct into a 
broader context." (citation omitted)); Levin, supra note 3, at 12 ("If you are like me, you have done 
things you hope remain hidden. Not terrible things-nothing criminal, . . .  but . . .  you want the lid to 
stay on. . . . All pertinent physical evidence and memories dissolved long ago in the cosmic increase 
in entropy, thank God."). 
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Scarlet Letter to see how severely society may stigmatize an arguably 
minor, or at least common, norm-violation (in that case, adultery).96 
A third example: we might feel that what an individual did was wrong 
but not that wrong, that she does not therefore deserve to lose her job, that 
her employer will still fire her if he finds out, and therefore that it is better 
that her norm-violation be concealed than disclosed. 
Finally, a fourth example: we might feel that what an individual did 
was very wrong but that it would still be better for her and those around her 
if she learned from her mistake on her own rather than from the overly 
harsh consequences that would ensue from disclosure. 
Objection 4: But what about situations in which the blackmail target's 
actions are egregious and therefore public disclosure is clearly warranted? 
Consider, again, the man who has a reputation as a faithful husband even 
though he cheats on his wife. Suppose now that he cheats on his wife not 
now and then but all the time. For years during his marriage, he has slept 
with hundreds of different women (or maybe only a few women hundreds 
of different times). Yet his reputation as a faithful husband remains 
untarnished. Clearly, he deserves to lose this reputation; his reputation 
therefore does not normatively belong to the family of LP interests; and the 
blackmailer is not committing a wrong comparable to menacing, 
harassment, or stalking by threatening to expose him and thereby give him 
the reputation that he deserves. 
Reply: Moral egregiousness is not a legal category. So the law cannot 
draw a sharp line between egregious and non-egregious behavior and 
therefore between instances in which one deserves to lose her reputation 
and those in which she does not.97 Instead, legislatures have a choice to 
make. On the one hand, they may establish the presumption that blackmail 
targets generally fall into the "egregious" category and therefore that 
threats to their reputations are not presumptively as wrong as threats to life, 
physical well-being, etc. On the other hand, legislatures may establish the 
presumption that blackmail targets generally fall into the "non-egregious" 
category and therefore that threats to their reputations are presumptively as 
wrong as threats to life, physical well-being, etc. If they choose the 
former, then there would seem to be little reason to make blackmail 
criminal. After all, the blackmail targets would simply be getting what 
they presumptively deserve. If they choose the latter, then most or all 
blackmail . would be illegal. The historical and empirical fact is that 
legislatures have overwhelmingly, if not universally, adopted the latter 
96 NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1 850). 
97 But see Friedman, supra note 3, at l l OO (referencing late 19th century Florida statutes that 
punished "flagrant" fornication more harshly than more occasional or clandestine fornication and late 
1 9th century California statutes that punished "open and notorious" adultery more harshly than more 
occasional or clandestine adultery). 
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approach. And this is very strong evidence indeed that these same 
legislatures regard blackmail as a serious and unjustified threat to a 
supremely valued interest (i.e., emotional well-being). 
Objection 5: Suppose that Seducer threatens to seduce Wife away from 
Husband unless Husband makes payment to Seducer. Because Husband 
loves Wife very much, she qualifies as one of his supremely valued 
interests. So, based on the argument in Part N.B, Seducer's threat should 
be criminalized. Yet this is absurd. Freedom of speech alone justifies 
Seducer's making a profit-motivated threat against Husband to seduce 
Wife.98 
Reply: There are two significant disanalogies between threats to ruin 
reputations by disclosing true information and threats to seduce spouses. 
The first disanalogy: all else being equal, the target of the threat of 
disclosure has little, if any, power to inhibit the disclosure. Without 
performing criminal acts like · kidnapping or unlawful imprisonment, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to keep others from talking about them. In 
contrast, Husband has greater power to inhibit Seducer's seducing Wife. 
Husband may try to weaken or undermine Seducer's seduction efforts not 
merely by trying to pressure or persuade Seducer not to make the attempt 
in the first place but also by trying to pressure or persuade Wife not to be 
seduced if Seducer does try. So while the potential victim of disclosure 
may hope only to keep the would-be gossip from disclosing, Husband has 
not merely one but two different avenues to pursue. 
The second disanalogy: partly because of the first disanalogy above, 
disclosure of information has a (much) higher likelihood of producing the 
desired result (damage to reputation) than do attempts at seduction. As we 
all know from dating, the latter are much more susceptible to failure than 
the former. Put more archaically, there is much more of a "necessary 
connection" between disclosure of reputation-damaging information and 
damage to reputation than attempts at seduction and actual seduction. 
While the former requires only people who are aware of social norms and 
have a cognitive understanding of the disclosure, the latter requires 
something more difficult to come by-namely, a willing object of 
seduction. 
For both these reasons, the target of the seduction threat is likely to 
feel less powerless and vulnerable-and therefore less threatened-than 
the target of a disclosure threat. So society may assume as a general rule 
that threats of seduction are not likely to produce the especially high levels 
of fear and anxiety that threats to life, physical well-being, family, liberty, 
property, and-yes-reputation will cause. 
98 I owe this objection to Walter Block. 
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D. Blackmail Is Not an Ordinary Economic Transaction 
The argument in Part lli.D suggests that there are no substantive 
differences between blackmail transactions and other ordinary economic 
transactions. In response to this argument, this section will simply draw 
upon the efforts of other scholars and borrow the assortment of substantive 
distinctions that they have argued exist between blackmail threats and 
ordinary economic transactions. While the reader may not agree with all 
of them, the aggregate collection certainly helps to cast doubt on the notion 
that the former may be easily assimilated into the latter: 
9) In a legitimate business transaction, the seller "is offering 
consideration in the form of abstaining from some profit or 
advantage which he might legitimately enjoy, and is quite 
different from the common blackmailer who surrenders no 
profit or advantage of his own in return for the money he 
receives. "99 
1 0) "One test whether there was a lawful business interest is 
whether some material advantage would come to the 
[blackmailer] through the carrying out of his threat. If so, 
he is usually entitled to renounce the advantage in return 
for the payment of money."100 
1 1 ) "The demands made by a businessman are constrained by 
the competition of other businessmen, by the fact that the 
party threatened is likely to have a good idea of whether 
the threat has to be taken seriously and by the adverse 
effects on future business of being difficult in negotiating. 
None of this applies in the ordinary blackmail case. There 
is no competition. The victim has to deal with the 
blackmailer."101 
99 A.H. Campbell, supra note 20, at 388. 
100 Williams, supra note 8, at 172; see also Altman, supra note 4, at 1640 (blackmailers differ 
significantly from other sellers since, unlike other sellers, they would give away their product were they 
not able to sell it); Comment, supra note 42, at 1478 ("[T]he blackmail transaction, unlike the [sale of 
newspapers], does not have a communicative purpose. The blackmailer uses the threat of 
communication only as a sanction to obtain property. It is irrelevant to the blackmailer whether the 
communication occurs."). 
101 Coase, supra note 1 1 , at 675; see also Kipnis, supra note 1, at 2 1  ("In a Libertarian utopia, it 
will be very, very lucrative to be alone in offering urgently needed goods and services to those who 
have only hideously unattractive alternatives. This is blackmail's distinctive economic beauty."); 
Owens, supra note 5, at 505 ("[T]he blackmailer is a monopolist and is in a position to dictate unfair 
terms of trade."). But see Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605 (rejecting this point as a distinction between 
blackmail and legal transactions); Waldron, supra note 14, at 14 ("It is sometimes said that a 
blackmailer bargains from a monopoly position. But he doesn't. What he depends on is the 'victim's 
understanding that, whatever the likelihood (short of certainty) of his being exposed by someone else, 
he is more likely than that to be exposed by the blackmailer if he doesn't give him what he asks."). 
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12) "[C]oncem for future business will not moderate a 
blackmailer's demands. If this factor has any influence, it 
pays the blackmailer to be unreasonable and even to carry 
out his threat, since this would make future victims take 
his threats more seriously."102 
13) '"Ordinary blackmail' is singled out [from other legitimate 
economic transactions], not because its bad features are 
unique, but because there is nothing good about it to 
overcome the badness. . . . 'Ordinary blackmail' is 
coercive, exploitative, invasive, etc., like many other social 
practices, but the point is that there is very little good 
about it."103 
14) "We could inhibit transactions in privacy without thereby 
inhibiting economic life and bargaining in general . . . .  
[But t ]he kind of worries which [criminal restrictions on 
ruthless but legal economic transactions] would introduce 
into economic life might well inhibit those general 
incentives which are, for better or worse, the lifeblood of a 
capitalistic economy."104 
15) "[The blackmail victim] cannot appeal to the law, since 
this would involve that disclosure of facts which he 1s 
anxious to avoid. "105 
16) "[T]he [ordinary commercial] transaction will be above 
board and so any illegal consequences will be more likely 
to be visible to the law."106 
1091 
1 02 Coase, supra note 1 1 , at 675. Lindgren rejects this point as a distinction between blackmail 
and legal transactions. Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605. 
103 Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 153. 
104 Murphy, supra note 5, at 166. 
105 Coase, supra note 1 1, at 675 ; see also H ardin, supra note 5, at 1814 ("A motivating factor of 
the intellectual debate over blackmail may be not its supposedly paradoxical aspect but merely the 
perverse quality of much blackmail: one cannot go to law to block its use and potential effects because 
Jaw is public."); Kipnis, supra note I, at 22 ("[T]he mark must waive the very secrecy he or she is 
contractually entitled to in order judicially to secure that same entitlement to secrecy: one must waive 
secrecy in order to secure secrecy . . . . [B]Iackmail contracts can require the client who seeks judicial 
relief to forfeit thereby all the entitlements explicitly guaranteed to him or her under the terms of the 
contract . . . . Contracts calling for the concealment of guilty secrets have precisely that flawed 
structure."); Levin, supra note 3, at 13 ("[S] ecret contracts are hard to enforce; suing a blackmailer 
would announce that the plaintiff has something to hide and, almost inevitably, what it is-as 
blackmailers would fully realize . . . . For that matter, most blackmailers would threaten disclosure to 
victims demanding a contract. "). But see Block, Replies, supra note 12, at 26 ("Blackmail secrets are 
in fact not so different from trade secrets. In both cases, there are dangers that attempts to force a 
contractual partner to live up to his obligations will boomerang."); Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605 
(rejecting this point as a distinction between blackmail and legal transactions). 
106 Smith, supra note 5, at 912. 
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1 7) In the ordinary commercial transaction, the seller ''is not 
using shame to his advanta�e and the offeree has · no 
resulting interest in secrecy."10 · 
1 8) Blackmail threats much more commonly motivate their 
targets to resort to harmful ''self-help" tactics-i.e., 
retaliating against the threat-makers or third parties with 
violence, turning to crime (theft or fraud) to pay off their 
blackmailers, and committing suicide. 108 
1 9) "Business negotiations (which may also cause anxiety) 
either lead to a breakdown of the negotiations or they lead 
to a contract. There is, at any rate, an end. But in the 
ordinary blackmail case there is no end. The victim, once 
he succumbs to the blackmailer, remains in his grip for an 
indefinite period."109 
20) Blackmail does not constitute a valid contract because the 
agreement to refrain from exercising "immoral liberties"-
107 Id. 
101 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
109 Coase, supra note 1 1 , at 675; see also Clark, supra note 9, at 60; DeLong. supra note 1 1 ,  at 
1 690-91 ;  Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1626 ("The essence of [the blackmailer's] dominance over [the 
target] is the prospect of repeated demands . . . .  Blackmail occurs when, by virtue of the demand and 
the action satisfying the demands, the blackmailer knows that she can repeat the demand in the future. 
Living with that knowledge puts the victim of blackmail in a permanently subordinate position."); 
Hardin, supra note 5, at 1 800; Isenbergh, supra note 1 ,  at 1930; Levin, supra note 3, at 14 (''[O]nce the 
buyer of an automobile drives it off the lot, the dealer is powerless to make further demands, whereas 
the blackmailer will almost always retain some leverage . . . . [T]he desire (or need) to which 
blackmail services cater persists after the service is rendered. After you have bought the blackmailer's 
silence, you still want him to be silent . . . . Obtaining the object of any standard desire eliminates the 
desire itself. But not with blackmail . . . . When I pay him not to tell, I stiff want (or need) him to 
refrain . . . But once the silence of the blackmailer is something to buy . . .  there is no end of it. The 
blackmailer's goods, one might say, can never be consumed."); Murphy, supra note 5, at 166 
(blackmail transactions are "unending in nature. Unlike oUter economic transactions, blackmail 
transactions often put the target in a position where she is never really sure if she has finally bought the 
commodity or servico-i.e., the silence, the freedom from exposure. The blackmailer is like the person 
who sells you shoes for an agreed price of $20, sneaks them out of your closet every week or so, and 
then sells them back to you (perhaps for $30 and then $40) again, and again, and again-endlessly."); 
Posner, supra note 5, at 1 840; Shavell, supra note 1 1 , at 1878, 1 884-87, 1 888, 1 890 (in-depth 
discussion of the problem of repeated demands). For critical responses, sec Altman, supra note 4, at 
1655-56 (making a similar point but later critiCizing Fletcher); Berman, supra note I ,  at 824-25 (the 
potential for repetition does not explain why blackmail is a crime); Block, supra note 1 ,  at 6-7; 
Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605 (rejecting the potential for repetition as a distinction between blackmail 
and legal transactions); Smith, supra note 5, at 889, 908-{)9 (the potential for repetition does not 
explain why blackmail is a crime). Block suggests that a possible solution to the problem of potential 
for repetition is to rent rather than sell silence on a "renewable" or "renegotiable" basis. Block, 
Replies, supra note 12, at 24. 
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i.e., from committing a violation "of a moral, although not 
a legal, duty"--does not constitute consideration, as it 
"would make the law a tool for extortion" and is therefore 
contrary to public policy. 1 1 0 
21) The difference between blackmail and legally permissible 
threats is that the former threaten to exercise "immoral 
liberty"-i.e., morally wrong but legally permissible 
actions-while the latter threaten to exercise only "moral 
liberties. "1 1 1  
22) While "central case blackmail" is "nonallocative," the 
ordinary commercial exchange is "allocative. "1 12 
23) The blackmailer intends to harm the target.1 13 
24) While even the hard economic transaction starts out with a 
non-coercive proposal, a proposal that does not force the 
target to choose between two of her rights, the blackmail 
transaction starts out with a coercive proposal, a proposal 
that does force the target to choose between two of her 
rights; l l4 
25) "[T]he avenues open to the [target] in the [ordinary 
commercial transaction] are more extensive and less 
harmful than the options ofthe blackmail victim."1 15 
26) We cannot expect blackmailers and their targets to weigh 
the costs, benefits, and risks of their transactions in a 
rational manner.1 16 
27) "[O]ur intuitions, for better or worse, probably lead us to 
sympathize with the [target of an expensive but 
desperately needed offer] more than with a blackmail 
victim."1 17 
110 Goodhart, supra note 7, at 436, 440-42, 448-49. 
1093 
1 1 1  See id at 436, 440-42, 448-49. Lindgren rejects Goodhart's position because it fails to 
explain why profit-motivated threats to perform morally permissible or obligatory actions (e.g., 
reporting incriminating information) are also considered blackmail. Lindgren, supra note l ,  at 910; 
Lindgren, supra note 8, at 681-82. 
1 12 Gordon, supra note 7, at 1770. 
113 /d. at 1771. 
1 14 See D. Campbell, supra note 20, at 885, 887-92. I articulated the opposite position toward the 
end of Part III.B. 
1 15 Smith, supra note 5, at 912. 
116 Id
. at 866, 872, 875-76, 879, 906. 
1 1 7  /d. at 913.  
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It would take too much space for me to express my opinion about each 
of these points. Suffice it to say that I believe that the majority of them are 
mostly, if not entirely, plausible. And all it takes is one or two of them to 
be correct to show that there are substantive differences between blackmail 
transactions and ordinary economic transactions and therefore that the two 
kinds of transactions may warrant different legal treatment. 
E. Legalization Would Not Help to Make Blackmail Targets Better Off 
The main problem with the argument that legalization of blackmail 
threats would help to make blackmail targets better off is that it is 
speculative and therefore counter-balanced by equally speculative 
considerations. First, if blackmail were legal, a greater number of people 
would be threatened than would have been threatened in a blackmail­
illegal society. For if blackmail were legal, there would be a greater 
incentive-hopes of profit minus the risk of criminal punishment-to "dig 
up" damaging information; and this greater incentive would translate into 
more people digging up more damaging information about more people. 
Second, if blackmail were legal, a greater amount of damaging 
information would be disclosed than would have been disclosed in a 
blackmail-illegal society. There are three reasons. The first reason is 
simply that a much greater pool of damaging information and a greater 
number of people sharing this information would be "dug up" than in a 
blackmail-illegal society. And where there is both more information and 
more people who know this information, there is a greater chance of 
"leakage"-accidental or deliberate. 
The second reason is that, in a blackmail-illegal society, there would 
be less incentive to dig up damaging information in the first place. So a 
greater fraction of the total (smaller) pool of damaging information would 
very likely have been obtained accidentally rather than deliberately. And, 
all else being equal, those who obtain damaging information accidentally 
are less likely to be malicious-and therefore less likely maliciously to 
disclose this information-than those who would deliberately dig up this 
kind of information. 
The third reason is that there is less of a disincentive in a blackmail­
legal society to disclose damaging information than in a blackmail-illegal 
society. In both societies, the same incentives for disclosure exist: to 
teach blackmail targets who do not make payment a lesson and to make 
their threats of disclosure all the more convincing to other actual and 
potential blackmail targets. But only in a blackmail-illegal society are 
these incentives counter-balanced by a significant disincentive: the 
heightened risk of criminal punishment. Disclosure heightens this risk 
because it potentially constitutes evidence of a prior blackmail threat. 
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F. If Blackmailer-Initiated Blackmail is Illegal, Then Target-Initiated 
Blackmail Should Be Illegal as Well 
If we assume that Blackmailer is guilty of criminal activity only when 
she initiates the silence-for-pay transaction with Target and not when 
Target initiates it, then we may proceed in one of two directions. We may 
either attempt to justify this asymmetry or we may argue that the law 
should, contrary to fact, treat Blackmailer-initiated silence-for-pay 
transactions in just the same way as Target-initiated silence-for-pay 
transactions. Importantly, however, this second approach may proceed in 
either direction. We may argue that because Blackmailer is not guilty of 
blackmail in Target-initiated transactions, she should not be guilty of 
blackmail in Blackmailer-initiated transactions either. Or we may argue 
the other way-that because Blackmailer is guilty of blackmail in 
Blackmailer-initiated transactions, she should be equally guilty of 
blackmail in Target-initiated transactions. 
This last approach is correct. 1 1 8  And the reason is simple: the very 
same principle applies in extortion law. If Target approaches some person 
P and asks P not to commit an illegal act against her in exchange for 
money and P then accepts the money, P has committed extortion just as 
much as if the same transaction had been initiated by P. 1 1 9 
1 1 8  See FEINBERG, supra note 23, at 264 ("One wonders why the legal consequences should be 
different when the same [silence-for-pay] transaction is initiated through [the blackmailer's] generosity 
rather than [the target's] guilty anxiety."). 
1 1 9  But see K. Christopher, supra note 8, at 1 1 32, 1 143-44, 1 147-48. See Lindgren, supra note 
l l , at 1703, 1716 ("Nor is extortion always initiated by the official. Even if extortion were limited to 
coercion (which it isn't), a citizen may begin discussing extortion if she correctly anticipates that she 
can't get fair treatment without making a payoff . .. .  This is consistent with the historical approach to 
extortion, an approach unconcerned with the precise method of wrongful taking-bribery, coercion, or 
false pretenses."); Lindgren, supra note 29, at 835-36 ("[T]he Hobbs Act punishes the person obtaining 
the property. It puts as little emphasis as possible on what or who does the inducing. The statute 
focuses instead on who does the obtaining."); Smith, supra note 5, at 907 ("[M]uch of what we call 
'extortion' . .. has the feature of preserving criminality in the mirror-image transaction. In official 
extortion, an official B demands a payment from A in return for not harming A . ... [A]s in bribery, 
both A and B are guilty regardless of whether A or B initiated the transaction." (citation omitted)). 
In personal correspondence, Mitch Berman suggests that I may be contradicting myself. Berman 
suggests that my central thesis that blackmail threats should be criminalized because (a) they cause 
undue fear and anxiety and (b) acts that cause undue fear and anxiety should be criminalized may 
commit me to the (absurd) position that even P's rejection of Target's offer should be criminalized. 
For P's rejection of Target's offer may cause Target undue fear and anxiety that P will go ahead and 
reveal her secret. My response to this very clever argument, however, is that I do not subscribe to (b). 
The mere fact that a particular (kind of) action causes serious fear and anxiety does not by itself 
warrant the conclusion that it should be criminalized. As I have argued above, the action must also not 
have a sufficiently counter-balancing moral or institutional justification. In this case, P's rejecting 
Target 's offer does have a sufficiently strong justification-namely, a moral and contract-law­
sanctioned right voluntarily to reject economic offers that are made to her. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Blackmail Paradox has survived for so many decades because 
scholars have misconstrued its essential nature. It is not essentially an 
amorphous metaphorical question about how two independently legal 
components-a legal threat and a legal demand-may add up to an illegal 
act. Rather, it is essentially a question of which is correct--our intuition 
that blackmail threats should be illegal or some very strong arguments that, 
given the legality of disclosure, blackmail threats should also be legal. 
This Article has offered both refutations of these arguments as well as a 
novel positive justification for criminalizing blackmail threats. Once 
again, blackmail threats should be criminal for the same reason that 
menacing, harassment, and stalking are: they involve the reasonable 
likelihood, not to mention intent, of putting the target into a state of 
especially great fear and anxiety. And we as a society have decided that­
like life, physical well-being, family, liberty, and property-emotional 
well-being is a supremely valued interest and therefore should be protected 
from deliberately inflicted injury when no competing moral or institutional 
interests, such as freedom of speech, would themselves be compromised. 
